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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
AN INSTITUTIONAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION IN THE  
GULF OF NICOYA, COSTA RICA 
by 
Alejandro García Lozano 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Joel T. Heinen, Major Professor 
Marine Areas for Responsible Artisanal Fishing (AMPR) have emerged as a new model 
for co-managing small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica, one that involves collaboration 
between fishers, government agencies and NGOs. This thesis aims to examine the context 
for collective action and co-management by small-scale fishers; evaluate the design, 
implementation, and enforcement of AMPRs; and conduct a linguistic analysis of 
fisheries legislation. The present work relies on the analysis of several types of qualitative 
data, including interviews with 23 key informants, rapid rural assessments, and legal 
documents. Findings demonstrate the strong influence of economic factors for sustaining 
collective action, as well as the importance of certain types of external organizations for 
community development and co-management. Additionally, significant enforcement gaps 
and institutional deficiencies were identified in the work of regulating agencies. Legal 
analysis suggests that mechanisms for government accountability are unavailable and that 
legal discourse reflects some of the most salient problems in management. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Costa Rica, dominant strategies for the management and conservation of 
marine-coastal resources involve top-down regulation by the Costa Rican Institute of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA) and the creation of marine protected areas 
(MPA) managed by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). As the state’s 
sole and independent agency for the regulation of fisheries, INCOPESCA has extensive 
regulatory competencies and responsibilities, but its deficiencies have been widely noted 
in the academic literature (e.g., Alpízar 2006; Araya 2012) and public outlets (e.g., 
Solano 2014). In addition, there are 20 MPAs in Costa Rica, most of which are adjoined 
to terrestrial protected areas within the nation’s extensive national park system, but cover 
only approximately 0.9% of the nations extensive exclusive economic zone (EEZ; 
Alvarado et al. 2012). Protected areas are designed for preserving biodiversity and 
restoring wildlife populations, but tend to have negative consequences for vulnerable 
social groups, such as displacement from resources that sustain rural livelihoods. Because 
MPAs result in the reallocation of various forms of property rights, the impacts can be 
wide-ranging, from debilitated local governance rights to decreased indicators of health, 
economic well-being, education, and social capital (Mascia and Claus 2008).  
Case studies from Central America and Costa Rica more specifically suggest that 
there may be conflicts of interest in the management of MPAs, which preferentially 
benefits profitable sectors (e.g., touristic sport fishing), and that there are a number of 
underlying social problems left to address (e.g., poverty, education), all of which 
preclude participatory and inclusive management (Solís Rivera et al. 2012). Additionally, 
communities generally do not feel included or represented in decision-making for the 
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management of MPAs in Costa Rica (Solís Rivera et al. 2012). In recent years, Costa 
Rica has adopted two new MPA classifications (i.e., Marine Reserve and Marine 
Management Area; Corella et al. 2011) that permit low-impact artisanal fishing, which 
reflects values of social sustainability generally recognized in fisheries legislation, as well 
as a trend towards recognizing small-scale fishers’ rights. However, no Marine Reserves 
have yet been established and only one Marine Management Area has been designated to 
protect the marine area surrounding Cocos Island National Park (Salas et al. 2012), 
making it difficult to assess their benefits at the present time.  
In recent years, several artisanal fishing organizations have worked to gain 
government recognition and counteract the impacts of poorly regulated commercial 
fishing, often in collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For 
instance, a marketing cooperative of fishers in the coastal Pacific village of Tárcoles, 
CoopeTárcoles R.L., have developed a relationship of associativity with CoopeSoliDar 
R.L., a cooperative that seeks to promote workers’ self-management and solidarity in 
rural communities. Their work with INCOPESCA has been instrumental for developing a 
novel and legally recognized model of marine spatial planning known as Marine Areas 
for Responsible Fishing (Área Marina de Pesca Responsible, AMPR). The AMPR is a 
co-management approach that recognizes the contributions of artisanal fishers in 
decision-making and facilitates the devolution of rights and responsibilities to 
communities. Several AMPRs have been created since the enabling legislation in 2009, 
but implementation remains at varying levels of progress. 
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Research Objectives 
In light of the potential benefits of AMPRs as a mechanism for improving 
management, conservation, and social sustainability, this research has several objectives 
to be addressed in two separate papers. In the first paper of the thesis (Chapter II), a 
primary objective is to describe the context in which co-management and community-
based conservation strategies are developing in this region. More specifically, I seek to 
determine how legal, institutional, and socio-economic factors interact to influence 
decision-making by stakeholders, as well as how they influence collective action. 
Additionally, because the AMPR is a relatively new management model, the other major 
objective for this paper is to identify its benefits, as well as problems or gaps in design, 
implementation, and enforcement. To achieve the proposed objectives, the current study 
relies on interviews with key informants, ethnographic observation, and the collection 
and review of pertinent documents (e.g., government reports, legislation, gray literature, 
academic literature). In a general sense, the aim of the first paper is to gain a greater 
understanding of the conditions that influence fishery regulation in Costa Rica in order to 
generate recommendations for the future management of AMPRs.  Some of the research 
questions guiding the present work include:  
 What kinds of incentives exist for collective action among artisanal fishers in 
Costa Rica, especially through cooperatives and fishing associations? 
 What incentives do fishing organizations have for participating in conservation and 
co-management of fishery resources? 
 What impact do NGOs as outside organizations have on social aspects of 
sustainability and conservation in the Gulf of Nicoya? 
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 How do cross-scale linkages and existing legal restrictions influence management 
and conservation in this region?   
 What problems, conflicts, or obstacles exist in the implementation of AMPRs? 
 
 The second paper (Chapter III) addresses an additional research question. As 
previously mentioned, some resource users (i.e., artisanal fishers) are disenfranchised 
from the decision-making processes that govern MPAs and fisheries regulation. In my 
analysis of qualitative data from interviews, participants’ responses suggested that rules 
and regulations are disproportionately aimed at small-scale fishers, and that government 
agencies are not accountable to some users. Accordingly, the objective of the second 
paper is to determine whether reported biases in regulation are reflected in the established 
legislative framework and legal discourse. The institutional grammar tool (IGT) 
developed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995), and further refined by Basurto et al. (2010) 
and Siddiki et al. (2012), is a method of linguistic analysis that is useful for studying 
complex policies and their influence as tools for prescribing human behavior (Basurto et 
al. 2010). For the second paper, I analyzed two pieces of Costa Rican legislation: the 
major law for managing fisheries and aquaculture and an executive decree issued to 
regulate the creation and administration of AMPRs.  
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II. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY GAP ANALYSIS:  
Evaluating Community-Based Co-management in Two Small-Scale  
Fisheries in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica 
 
1. Introduction 
In Costa Rica, a developing Central American nation with an extensive, bicoastal 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ, 613,683 km2; FAO 2004), fisheries have been subject to 
increasing exploitation since the 1980s by multiple sectors, including commercial tuna 
and sardine seiners, semi-industrial shrimp trawlers, and a diverse artisanal or small-scale 
sector (Alpízar 2006). Over the years, a great deal of conflict has arisen among different 
sectors, as well as with government agencies, in the midst of worsening scarcity. 
Conflicts have been especially pronounced in the more productive and heavily exploited 
fisheries of the Pacific region, such as the Gulf of Nicoya, a tropical estuary of great 
ecological and socioeconomic importance (Mack et al. 1992; Alpízar 2006). 
Traditionally, the Gulf of Nicoya has been the most important region for the 
nation’s fisheries, with reported landings that accounted for approximately 65% of total 
production in Costa Rica during 1994-2005 (Chacón et al. 2007). A confluence of factors 
including oceanic currents, nutrient upwellings, and seasonal discharge from several 
effluent rivers (e.g., Tárcoles River, Tempisque River) contribute to high primary 
productivity in the gulf, which supports a rich biodiversity of fish and benthic 
invertebrates (Vargas 1995). Coastal ecosystems found in the region include mangrove 
forests, rocky reefs, and fluvial estuaries (Salas et al. 2012). Several commercially 
valuable taxa are targeted in the Gulf of Nicoya, the most important of which include 
 6
snappers (Family: Lutjanidae), croakers (corvinas, Family: Sciaenidae), snook 
(Centropomus spp.), seabasses (“cabrillas”; Paralabrax spp.), and prawns or shrimp 
(Family: Penaeidae; FAO 2004). In addition, the livelihoods of thousands of artisanal 
fishers from at least 16 distinct fishing communities depend directly on the abundance of 
fish in the Pacific region (FAO 2004). The exact number of artisanal fishers in the gulf is 
difficult to estimate, given the largely informal and unreported nature of artisanal fishing 
along the Pacific coast (Mug 2013), but it has been estimated that there are over 12,000 
artisanal fishers in Costa Rica, whose landings account for approximately 73% of total 
capture, and a large portion of whom inhabit the coastal region surrounding the gulf 
(Turriago 2013). 
Since the 1980s, coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of Nicoya and along the Pacific 
coast have been subject to abrupt and increasing pressures posed by rapid coastal 
development, contamination and degradation of watersheds, the increased demand for 
agricultural and fisheries products, and widespread illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing (Mack et al. 1992; Turriago 2013). Development during the 1980s also 
facilitated the growth of a commercial industry for the harvest of shrimp using bottom 
trawls, a notoriously non-selective method that has had negative impacts on coastal 
ecosystems and fishing communities (Gallardo 2009; Alvarez and Ross 2010). 
Unsustainable rates of harvest have resulted in the commercial extinction of two target 
prawn species (Heterocarpus affinis and H. vicarious), as well as an overall increase in 
the number of species harvested (Wehrtmann and Nielsen-Muñoz 2009). Bycatch from 
trawling in the gulf has also had significant effects on the stocks of other species that are 
important for small-scale fisheries and food security (FAO 2004; Gallardo 2009). 
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Trawling has been prohibited in the inner gulf since 1966, but it persists in adjacent areas 
where it greatly disturbs the seabed and threatens ecologically important taxa (e.g., 
sharks, sea turtles), as well as commercially valuable species that inhabit the outer gulf 
during their life cycle (Campos et al. 1984).  
Strategies for fisheries management adopted in Costa Rica are primarily 
bureaucracy-based, especially in the form of weak top-down regulation (i.e., fishing 
licenses and localized closed seasons; Alpízar 2006) by the Costa Rican Institute of 
Fishing and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA), a decentralized agency of the Executive Power. 
A total of 20 marine protected areas (MPAs) also exist in Costa Rica, which are managed 
by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), but only cover 0.9% of the 
nation’s EEZ (Alvarado et al. 2012). National legislation and policies emphasize the 
importance of sustainable use of natural resources to ensure environmental protection, 
social sustainability, and economic growth (e.g., preamble to the Costa Rican Law of 
Fishing and Aquaculture; Poder Legislativo 2005). Until recently, however, no distinct 
mechanisms existed to recognize small-scale fishing communities’ perspectives or 
facilitate their involvement in management.  
In 2009, after urging from several communities and supporting NGOs, an 
Executive Decree was issued to legally recognize a type of community-based marine 
protected area known as Área Marina de Pesca Responsible (AMPR, or Marine Area for 
Responsible Fishing; Poder Ejecutivo 2009). An AMPR is a geographically delineated 
area of biological, fishing, or social importance, in which fishing is restricted to ensure 
sustainable use, management, and conservation through cooperation between 
government, communities, and other organizations (Poder Ejecutivo 2009). Only 
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artisanal fishing methods are permitted in AMPRs (i.e., only manually operated gear and 
small vessels). In order to obtain the AMPR designation, a fishing community or 
organization must present a management plan proposal that demonstrates the social and 
ecological value of the marine area, outlines gear restrictions, and maps the area through 
a participatory zoning process. Once approved, community members must form 
monitoring committees by working with INCOPESCA and the national coastguard 
service (Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas, SNG) to ensure that AMPRs are protected 
from harmful fishing activities. Because it stems from the initiatives of fishing 
communities and their grassroots organizations, the AMPR designation was initially 
proposed as a form of community-based conservation, or one in which communities have 
sole responsibility for managing the area. However, in its current form the AMPR model 
represents a co-management approach, characterized by shared and collaborative 
governance of a protected area (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). Several AMPRs have 
now been established in Costa Rica, the majority of which are located in the Gulf of 
Nicoya region, but their implementation remains at varying degrees of progress.  
  Given the complexity and multiplicity of actors involved in the management of 
Costa Rican fisheries, a major objective of the present work is to elucidate the 
institutional, social, and economic context for collective action among fishers, as well as 
their contributions to co-management and community-based conservation in AMPRs. 
More specifically, the purpose of this work is to determine some of the conditions and 
incentives that facilitate collective action by fishing organizations, with emphasis on the 
role of communities and NGOs. Because of its utility for characterizing the influence of 
contextual factors on decision-making and social institutions, I employ the Institutional 
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Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom (2005, 2007), with 
special emphasis on its application for social-ecological systems and fisheries (Imperial 
and Yandle 2005; Ostrom 2009). An additional objective of the present work is to 
evaluate the design and implementation processes for two specific AMPRs—one in the 
locality of Tárcoles, a community on the banks of the outer gulf, and another in Chira, a 
large island in the inner gulf—using the design principles of enduring common-pool 
resource (CPR) institutions proposed by Ostrom (1990), which have been subsequently 
re-framed in Anderies et al. (2004) and Cox et al. (2010). The purpose of analyzing co-
management in AMPRs through Ostrom’s principles is to identify both strengths and 
problems in design, implementation, and enforcement. To achieve the proposed research 
objectives, my research relies on the analysis of several types of qualitative data, 
including: interviews with key informants, rapid rural assessments, ethnographic 
observational data, and review of legal documents and gray literature. The following 
section provides important background information on participatory fisheries 
management, as well as the study sites and the methodology used in this research. 
 
1.1. Literature Review 
Since the 1950s, marine and coastal fisheries across the globe have been subject 
to a pattern of increasing industrialization and exploitation, partly as a result of 
technology developed during the two world wars, which led to a drastic increase in 
fishing capacity (FAO 2012). Other factors contributing to exploitation include rapid 
development and human population growth, which have increased capitalization and 
global demand for seafood. Additionally, Pauly et al. (2002) have pointed out the 
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importance of political pressures to enhance production in newly expanded EEZs 
following the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, wherein ratifying 
nations agreed to allow other parties to exploit resources they could not (Pauly et al. 
2002). Over the course of a few decades, overexploitation led to the collapse of several 
major fisheries, the most notorious of which include the Peruvian anchoveta (Engraulis 
ringens) in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the 
northwestern Atlantic (Pauly et al. 2002). Global marine landings reached a peak of 86.4 
million tonnes in 1996, and have continued to decline in spite of sustained fishing effort 
(FAO 2012). Maintaining current consumption levels has only been possible because of 
efforts to manage and artificially enhance global stocks, as well as the proliferation of 
aquaculture (Pauly et al. 2002).  
Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) support approximately 90% of all fisheries jobs 
worldwide, an estimate that includes both harvest and post-harvest labor (FAO and 
WorldFish Center 2008). In developing nations, more than half of all fisheries landings 
are produced by SSFs, of which 90-95% are destined for human consumption (FAO & 
WorldFish Center 2008). Direct consumption of fishery products is an important source 
of protein and micronutrients that may not be present in the staple diets of developing 
nations (Béné et al. 2007). In addition, participation in SSFs plays a significant role in 
ensuring food security and preventing poverty, either through direct consumption or 
indirectly as a source of income (Béné et al. 2007). Unfortunately, SSFs in developing 
nations are especially vulnerable to several factors that drive overexploitation and 
resource scarcity, including poor management, weak property rights and governance 
regimes, the neoliberalization of global and regional markets, poverty, and external 
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environmental factors such as climate variability and pollution (Allison and Ellis 2001; 
Béné et al. 2007; Kittinger et al. 2013; Defeo et al. 2013). Additionally, the contributions 
of SSFs to food security and poverty alleviation in developing nations have previously 
been overlooked, and in some cases actively undermined, by dominant strategies for 
fisheries management (Béné et al. 2007).  
Traditional approaches to management stem from the hegemonic intellectual 
thought of the mid-20th century, which emphasized economic markets and centralized, 
hierarchical government as the most favorable kinds of institutions for regulating private 
goods and ensuring compliance (Ostrom 2010). The conclusions of influential work by 
economic and political theorists like Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) about the 
economic failures and tragedies of open-access resources have been generalized and 
translated to the need for government regulation and privatization (Ostrom 1990). As a 
result, the most widely applied forms of management involve (1) top-down regulatory 
mechanisms aimed at reducing fishing effort and, increasingly, (2) the recognition of 
private property rights for participation in market-based quota systems (i.e., rights-based 
management, RBM; Ohashi 2010).  
On one hand, centralized regulation of fishing inputs (e.g., gear and season 
restrictions, vessel buybacks) has largely failed to address overcapacity and, in some 
cases, has actually intensified competition and uncertainty among fishers (Beddington et 
al. 2007). Centralized governance also takes place through fishing restrictions in MPAs. 
As Beddington et al. (2007) point out, when the underlying problems driving 
overcapacity are not addressed, MPAs may simply shift overexploitation, creating 
patches of conservation. In addition, because they reallocate property rights over natural 
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resources (e.g., access, withdrawal, exclusion), MPAs can lead to the displacement of 
vulnerable social groups, such as small-scale fishers and indigenous communities 
(Mascia and Claus 2008). On the other hand, RBM approaches (e.g., individual 
transferable quotas, ITQ) have been relatively more effective for achieving conservation 
goals, reducing uncertainty among fishers, and redistributing costs, but may similarly 
displace small-scale fishers who cannot afford the costs of entering quota allocation 
systems (Dewees 1989). Recognizing the rights of fisher groups or communities through 
collectively allocated community development quotas (CDQs) can potentially address 
some of the social impacts of RBM (McCay 2004; Ohashi 2010). In the United States, 
limited access privilege programs (LAPP) have been established to allocate shares of the 
total allowable catch (TAC) in a specific fishery to individuals, communities, and fishing 
organizations (e.g., associations, cooperatives; see Anderson and Holiday 2007).  
Participatory approaches to fisheries management have gained increasing 
recognition over the last few decades as an alternative to centralized management 
(Ostrom 1990; Jentoft et al. 1998; Alpízar 2006; Gutiérrez et al. 2011). Participatory 
management refers to the direct involvement of users and other stakeholders in decision-
making and other policy processes (e.g., implementation, enforcement), with varying 
degrees of decentralization. Two major types of participatory management are 
recognized: (1) community-based management (CBM) approaches are those in which 
resource users have all responsibility for managing and protecting natural resources, 
whereas (2) co-management may refer to a number of arrangements in which there is 
collaboration between resource users, governments, and possibly other stakeholders 
(Alpízar 2006). Wiber et al. (2004) argue for distinguishing between ‘community-based 
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co-management’, wherein communities have primary rights and responsibilities with 
some remaining government involvement, and what they term ‘sector-based co-
management’, in which the government works with one specific fishery sector. 
Moreover, some co-management arrangements in developing nations have been 
coordinated by communities and NGOs in the absence of government participation 
(Evans et al. 2011). Co-management has been proposed as an integration of other 
commonly applied approaches—a compromise between bureaucratic regulation (e.g., 
top-down controls and MPAs) and community-based management, as well as one that 
can include market-based policies (Yandle 2003).  
In recent years, the concept of adaptive co-management has received considerable 
attention in the academic literature (Folke et al. 2003; Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Berkes 
2009; Armitage et al. 2009). The term refers to a combination of co-management and 
adaptive management, in which policy processes and/or outcomes are evaluated and 
continually improved through collaborative decision-making. Adaptive co-management 
stems from the acknowledgement that fisheries, like other natural resources, are part of 
complex and adaptive social-ecological systems (SES), wherein social institutions 
interact extensively and interdependently with the biophysical world (Berkes and Folke 
1998). Through the lens of the SES paradigm, which combines aspects of ecological 
theory with the study of social systems, adaptive capacity in management can increase 
social-ecological resilience (Folke et al. 2003; Armitage et al. 2009)—in this context, 
resilience refers to the amount of disturbance or change necessary for a system to move 
from one relatively stable state to another (Anderies et al. 2004). For instance, Tompkins 
and Adger (2004) have proposed that adaptive co-management increases resilience to 
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unpredictable disturbances, specifically climate change, by creating social networks that 
respond to changes in resource availability and by preserving ecological integrity, which 
may preclude resource collapse in response to disturbance. In addition, co-management is 
increasingly understood as a process of active problem solving in the context of dynamic 
SESs (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). 
A number of other benefits are commonly associated with co-management, 
including increased efficiency, decreased transaction costs, greater success in meeting 
management goals, risk-sharing by actors, and ease of conflict resolution (Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005), as well as social learning, trust, and the growth of local institutions (Berkes 
2009). In a meta-analysis of co-management arrangements for small-scale fisheries in 
developing nations, Evans et al. (2011) found general support for improved conditions as 
measured by social, governance, and environmental indicators, especially at the level of 
management processes. Meanwhile outcome indicators identified were generally positive 
but more variable, reflecting the process-oriented nature of co-management. It is 
important to note that no single management regime should be prescribed as ideal in all 
situations (Basurto and Ostrom 2009) and that user participation does not suffice to 
ensure good management (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Theoretical Framework  
 Common-pool resources (CPR) such as forests, fisheries, and irrigation water 
sources are characterized by limited resource flow, high subtractability (i.e., one user’s 
appropriation of resource units reduces the amount available to other users), and a high 
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cost of excluding non-group members from accessing the resource (Ostrom 1990). In 
fisheries, the fugitive nature of the resource exacerbates some of the problems with 
uncertainty of future access and exclusion. Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) review of diverse case 
studies detailing long-lasting, self-governing institutions for the management of CPRs 
provides rich support for the possibility of participatory management. Findings from CPR 
institutions and game theory have demonstrated that resource users are capable of 
devising rules to address resource overexploitation and overcome the tragedy of the 
commons, or as it should be more aptly known, the ‘tragedy of open-access’ scenario, 
which predicts that all individuals are rational egoists and fail to act collectively without 
externally imposed structures for management (Basurto and Ostrom 2009). 
 Over the years, the work of Ostrom and colleagues in the Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, Bloomington, which began in 1973, 
has solidified into the IAD framework, a comprehensive and transdisciplinary approach 
to the study of institutions and collective action (Ostrom 2005, 2007). Under the IAD 
framework, institutions are defined as the “prescriptions that humans use to organize all 
forms of repetitive and structured interaction” (Ostrom 2005, 3). The core analytical unit 
of the IAD framework is the action arena, the setting in which actors make decisions by 
interacting with or within an action situation. The action situation is the set of 
institutions, community attributes, and other external factors that influence decision-
making (Ostrom 2005; Figure 1). Imperial and Yandle (2005) have summarized some of 
the important factors to consider for the analysis of fisheries policy using the IAD 
framework (Table 1). In the present work, their guidelines serve as a tool for 
understanding contextual factors, decision-making, and overall performance with regards 
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to the AMPR model as it has been instituted in Costa Rica. In addition to the former, my 
analysis includes consideration of socio-economic power relations and discourse as 
elements that influence the action arena, which Clement (2010) proposed as a means to 
enrich the scope of analysis using the IAD framework, particularly for the study of 
decentralized natural resource governance. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. 
(Source: Ostrom 2011) 
 
 
 
Table 1. Important factors for fisheries policy analysis using the IAD Framework. 
(Adapted from Imperial and Yandle, 2005).  
 
Area of analysis Specific factors for consideration 
 
Examining the Contextual Setting 
 
Biophysical setting 
Community attributes 
Existing institutional setting 
Examining Transaction Costs Information costs 
Coordination costs 
Strategic costs (e.g., free riding) 
Assessing Overall Institutional 
Performance 
Efficiency 
Equity 
Accountability 
Adaptability 
Policy outcomes 
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 In her seminal book Governing the Commons, Ostrom (1990) identified eight 
design principles that characterize long-standing institutions for the management of CPRs 
(Table 2), which have since received a great deal of support in the years of ensuing 
research (Ostrom 2000; Cox et al. 2010). Some of the key design principles include: 
appropriate boundaries for the resource in question and user groups, user participation in 
decision-making at the collective choice level (i.e., determining rules that affect day-to-
day operational rules), appropriate monitoring and sanctions, access to conflict 
resolution, and government recognition of CPR institutions. The design principles can be 
used as a diagnostic and predictive tool, a key to understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of governance schemes. For instance, Yandle (2003) applied the design 
principles to evaluate the devolution of rights to stakeholder groups and the resulting co-
management regime in New Zealand. On the other hand, Anderies et al. (2004) have 
reframed the design principles, proposing them as baseline criteria for evaluating the 
robustness of SESs (i.e., robustness as a measure of sustained system performance in the 
face of disturbance, or a system’s capacity to withstand stresses without transitioning to a 
different, degraded stable state).   
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Table 2. Design principles for enduring CPR governance regimes. Source: Ostrom 2010. 
 
 
Design Principle Description 
1A. User Boundaries Clear and locally understood boundaries 
between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present.  
 
1B. Resource Boundaries Clear boundaries that separate a specific 
common-pool resource from a larger social-
ecological system are present.  
 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and environmental 
conditions. 
 
2B. Appropriation and Provision Appropriation rules are congruent with 
provision rules; the distribution of costs is 
proportional to the distribution of benefits. 
 
3. Collective Choice Arrangements Most individuals affected by a resource regime 
are authorized to participate in making and 
modifying its rules. 
 
4A. Monitoring Users Individuals who are accountable to or are the 
users monitor the appropriation and provision 
levels of the users. 
 
4B. Monitoring the Resource Individuals who are accountable to or are the 
users monitor the condition of the resource.  
 
5. Graduated Sanctions Sanctions for rule violations start very low but 
become stronger if a user repeatedly violates a 
rule. 
 
6. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving 
conflicts among users or with officials. 
 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights The rights of local users to make their own 
rules are recognized by the government.  
 
8. Nested Enterprises When a common-pool resource is closely 
connected to a larger social-ecological system, 
governance activities are organized in multiple 
nested layers. 
 
  
 19
 In the present work, Ostrom’s design principles guide the analysis of qualitative 
data from key informant interviews and literature review. The design principles 
framework will be used to identify the strengths of AMPRs as a management approach, 
with emphasis on two specific cases, as well as to conduct a policy gap analysis of 
AMPR implementation and enforcement. That is, interviews will be used to identify 
problems and gaps in management. The process of analyzing qualitative data and 
identifying themes constitutes a research process that is largely inductive and rooted in 
the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967 in Hansen 2005), in which the 
formulation of theory and explanations is driven by work in the field and the analysis of 
qualitative data, rather than by testing hypotheses.  
 Key informants are individuals with extensive, specialized knowledge about 
social groups, local processes, policies, etc. that results from their position within a social 
system (Payne and Payne 2004). Key informants are valuable because they are willing 
and able to transmit their extensive knowledge to the researcher (Bernard 2006). Ideally, 
key informants should be unbiased (Tremblay 1957), but many of the actors involved in 
the management of natural resources have personal stakes in their work and the groups of 
people they represent, making it unrealistic to expect absolute objectivity from 
informants. Interviews with key informants have traditionally been used in ethnographic 
work, but can be useful for rapidly generating substantial amounts of qualitative and even 
quantitative data in other kinds of social research, where the focus may be narrower 
(Trembley 1957). Heinen (2010) has illustrated the utility of key informant interviews 
and other social science instruments for exploring social dimensions of conservation 
approaches (e.g., PAs) and identifying gaps along the policy process in the management 
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of natural resources. Key informant interviews have been used for similar analyses in a 
number of settings, including: assessing the enforcement of regulations and management 
of a nature reserve in Kyrgyzstan (Ter-Ghazaryan and Heinen 2006); evaluating the 
regulation of the non-timber forest product (NTFP) sector in Nepal (Shrestha-Acharya 
and Heinen 2009); and identifying problems with the implementation of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in Nepal 
(Dongol and Heinen 2012).  
  
2.2. Study Site Description: Two AMPRs in the Gulf of Nicoya  
The first AMPR in Costa Rica was created in 2009 in Isla Chira, the largest island 
in the inner gulf, which is inhabited by five distinct fishing communities that rely 
primarily on artisanal fishing and rural tourism activities (Salas et al. 2012), as well as 
agriculture and salt extraction from saltpans or salinas (Babeu et al. 2013). Fishers in the 
community of Palito, who predominantly fish using handlines, organized collectively as a 
fishing association and made the initial request to establish the AMPR to address conflict 
with outside fishers who exploit the area with illegal, non-selective gear, such as fine-
mesh gillnets (Marín et al. 2012). The AMPR has since been expanded to include the 
waters surrounding the locality of Montero, where fishers belong to another fishing 
association (INCOPESCA 2012). The Palito-Montero AMPR comprises an area of 
approximately 6.12 km2 and protects the rocky reefs and mangroves found around the 
island, which serve as important breeding grounds and nurseries for pelagic species in the 
gulf (Salas et al. 2012; CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013). 
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Tárcoles is a village of approximately 4,300 inhabitants located on the continental 
coastline of the outer gulf, immediately south of the Tárcoles River delta, where conflicts 
between the artisanal and semi-industrial trawling sectors have been particularly 
pronounced (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a). Approximately 50% of the people of Tárcoles 
benefit directly or indirectly from fishing activities (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a). Shrimp 
populations are especially high along the coastal zone of Tárcoles due to estuarine 
conditions near the mouth of the river and the role of mangroves as nurseries. The semi-
industrial sector therefore concentrates its activities in this region, while artisanal fishers 
also harvest shrimp using gillnets with a mesh width of approximately 3 in. Artisanal 
fishers in Tárcoles have attributed worsening resource scarcity to the destructive practices 
of the trawlers that, until recently, swept the littoral zone without any restrictions 
(Gallardo 2009).  
In 1985, a group of artisanal fishers in Tárcoles organized collectively to form a 
marketing cooperative, the Cooperative of Fishers of Tárcoles, or CoopeTárcoles R.L. 
Through the cooperative, members and non-members can sell their products at equitable 
prices and obtain supplies for fishing excursions (e.g., bait, ice), while members can also 
access subsidized fuel, store fishing gear, finance expenses, and collectively apply for 
fishing licenses. In 2000, CoopeTárcoles R.L. formed a relationship of associativity with 
CoopeSoliDar R.L., a non-governmental organization (NGO) operating under the 
cooperative framework, dedicated to facilitating workers’ self-management and social 
solidarity in rural communities. It is through this partnership that community members 
began to take steps toward the conservation and sustainable use of the coastal-marine 
resource on which they depend. They voluntarily adopted a code of conduct based on the 
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United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) guidelines for responsible 
fisheries (FAO 1995), which has been legally recognized as a guiding tool for 
management and conservation in Costa Rica (Poder Ejecutivo 1998), and also created a 
database to monitor landings. Additionally, CoopeTárcoles R.L. and CoopeSoliDar R.L. 
formed a consortium (i.e., Consorcio Por La Mar R.L.) to develop community-based 
tourism in Tárcoles, which provides an alternative source of income for fishers and other 
community members.     
The AMPR of Tárcoles was officially approved in 2011 (INCOPESCA 2011) 
after direct negotiations between CoopeTárcoles R.L., who represented the local artisanal 
sector, and representatives of the semi-industrial shrimp sector. The AMPR of Tárcoles 
has an area of approximately 108.8 km2 (Salas et al. 2012), and has six different zones 
(Figure 2), each with specific gear restrictions for harvesting finfish (escama) and shrimp. 
For instance, in Zone 2, which extends from the mouth of the Tárcoles River to the 
locality of Tárcoles, only handline fishing is permitted from the coast until the 15m-depth 
bathymetry line; other gear types are permitted beyond that depth, but no fishing of any 
kind is permitted within a 1 km radius of the mouth of the river (INCOPESCA 2011). 
Fishers in Tárcoles employ various gear types, including gillnets with mesh sizes ranging 
between 3 in. and 7 in., as well as bottom-set and drifting longlines. They fish in small 
vessels or pangas made of fiberglass, approximately 3 m in length, which have outboard 
motors and rudimentary iceboxes for preserving product during trips. 
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Figure 2. Map of the AMPR of Tárcoles, showing different zones with varying gear 
restrictions (Source: CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010b). 
 
 
 
2.3. Key Informant and Informal Interviews 
 I conducted semi-structured interviews with 23 key informants who were actively 
involved in artisanal fishing, marine conservation, fisheries management, and AMPRs in 
the Gulf of Nicoya region. Interviews were carried out between July and August of 2013. 
Participants can be divided into two major groups: (1) local fishers and community 
members (n=15) and (2) institutional representatives of community organizations, NGOs, 
or public agencies (n=8). The majority of informants from Group 1 were residents of 
Tárcoles, except for a family of subsistence fishers living in the nearby community of 
Playa Azul, located between the town of Tárcoles and the mouth of the river. Group 1 
was composed of 4 members of CoopeTárcoles; 6 independent fishers, all of whom also 
sold product to the cooperative; 3 ex-members of the cooperative who fished for several 
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years but are currently engaged in other occupations; one post-harvest and clerical worker 
for CoopeTárcoles R.L.; and one local innkeeper with a long history of fishing in 
Tárcoles, currently also involved in community-based tourism with Consorcio PorLaMar 
R.L. On the other hand, Group 2 consisted of two representatives of community 
organizations in Tárcoles; three members of NGOs working with fishing communities in 
the Tárcoles and Chira AMPRs (i.e., CoopeSoliDar R.L. and Fundación MarViva 
respectively); two members of government agencies involved in fisheries regulation and 
conservation (i.e., INCOPESCA and the SNG); and finally, one researcher and professor 
at the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (UNA), Puntarenas, who has been involved in 
developing baseline ecological research for AMPRs in the gulf.  
 Sampling for participants was non-random and purposive (Bernard 2006), as 
informants were specifically chosen because of their roles in communities and 
organizations. In some cases, the selection of informants was participant-driven, or 
influenced by referral from other informants and inquiries within the community. Prior to 
being interviewed, participants were informed about the general purpose of this research 
and assured that participation would be voluntary and, in the case of Group 1, 
anonymous. Representatives of CoopeTárcoles R.L. and CoopeSoliDar R.L. were 
opposed to the anonymity of their statements and those of cooperative members, citing 
the problematic erasure of actors’ personhood and humanity in scientific research. 
Because informants in Group 2 represent specific organizations and were interviewed in 
their corresponding workplaces, their identities are not anonymous. A list of institutional 
informants can be found in Appendix 1. However, in order to protect other participants 
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from any unintended consequences that may result from their responses about other 
actors, the identities of informants in Group 1 will remain anonymous.  
 A great deal of baseline socio-economic information has been collected for the 
communities of Tárcoles (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2006, 2009, 2010a) and Isla Chira (Babeu 
et al. 2012), which heavily informs the current analysis. In my interviews with fishers and 
community members in Tárcoles, questions focused instead on determining participants’ 
relationship to fishing, fishery regulation, involvement in AMPRs, and their perceptions 
of the strengths and weaknesses of management policies and institutions for collective 
action. Specific interview questions varied for each informant, as the interview process 
led to differing subjects of discussion. For Group 1, interviews began with questions 
about participants’ life history in relation to fishing, their current occupation, and their 
perception of the current state of fishing as an economic activity. Then, fishers in Group 
1 were asked about the economic activities they adopted, both generally and in response 
to scarcity, in order to assess the degree of flexibility in their livelihood strategies. 
Finally, informants in Group 1 were asked about the benefits of belonging to the local 
cooperative (CoopeTárcoles R.L.), as opposed to working independently; the problems 
they observed in the cooperative and regulation in general; and their opinion on the 
importance of marine conservation.  
 Similarly, interview questions varied in specificity between informants in Group 
2, but were designed to understand the role of individuals and their corresponding 
organizations in fisheries management, regulation, marine conservation, and their work 
with communities. Interviews began with questions about informants’ work and area of 
expertise, as well as their involvement with communities and specific AMPRs. Then, 
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informants were asked about their opinion on current management in AMPRs, the 
strengths of the approach, and the obstacles or problems they perceived. Informants were 
prompted to expand their explanations of conflicts, problems, and difficulties in the 
management of AMPRs and fisheries in general. In the case of representatives of 
government agencies especially, questions also sought to clarify informants’ specific 
roles in management, their perceptions of other actors, and problems they identified with 
implementation and enforcement of national policies. 
 In addition to interviews with key informants, I carried out a number of informal 
interviews with fishers and community members in the localities of Tárcoles, Isla Chira, 
Puntarenas, and Costa de Pájaros to supplement my knowledge of community dynamics 
and conduct a rapid rural appraisal (RRA; Chambers 1994) of fishers’ attitudes, 
observations, and their perceptions of problems in fisheries management. Participants for 
informal interviews were selected using purposive, participant-driven sampling in 
Tárcoles—i.e., obtaining information from community members with whom I became 
familiar, as well as others to whom they referred me. Sampling was less purposive in the 
other locations. Interviews were carried out along major areas where fishers gathered 
(e.g., the port and fish market of Puntarenas; the port of entry and hostels in Isla Chira).  
 
2.4. Qualitative Data Analysis 
 Interviews were recorded using a digital audio recording device, translated from 
Spanish to English, and transcribed into separate documents. The translated transcripts 
were subsequently coded using the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
Atlas.ti (version 7.0). After a preliminary coding of transcripts using broad themes (e.g., 
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equity, conflict, accountability), a structured coding system was created to facilitate the 
identification of emergent themes and subthemes, as well as to address specific research 
questions. Findings from coded interviews are supplemented with review of a number of 
documents produced by NGOs working with the communities of interest, government 
reports, and other relevant literature. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Socio-economic and Institutional Context for Collective Action and AMPRs 
The economic activities of greatest importance in Costa Rica are tourism, for 
which the nation is widely known, and the production of agricultural and industrial goods 
for exportation. Following a dire economic crisis in the late 1970s, the latter industries 
experienced rapid recovery and growth as a result of structural adjustment economic 
policies adopted in the 1980s, which were fostered through loans from the World Bank 
(Vega 1996). Structural adjustment was characterized by increased market liberalization, 
privatization of industries formerly regulated by government, and the development of 
powerful neo-exportation sectors for trade with the U.S. and Europe (Vega 1996). 
Between 1976 and 1983, the Costa Rican government implemented a similar 
development model, promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which 
aimed to increase productivity in the nation’s fisheries and improve the socioeconomic 
status of fishers (Ovares 1989). Approximately $20 million were allocated for 
investments, which focused mainly on the development of infrastructure (e.g., port 
facilities, vessel construction) and the promotion of fishing cooperatives in the artisanal 
sector (Breton 1991). However, according to Breton (1991), these initiatives constituted a 
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resounding failure: the budget was neither fully nor efficiently utilized, fewer vessels 
were constructed than initially planned, and a cooperative created for managing 
development activities dissolved after declaring bankruptcy. Additionally, in the absence 
of capacity building to accompany technological improvements, these development 
policies exacerbated debts and losses in the artisanal sector (Breton 1991).  
The cooperative model has been promoted in Costa Rica and readily accepted as 
beneficial for stimulating economic growth and development in rural communities—not 
only through the aforementioned structural adjustment initiative, which provided 
economic incentives and capitalization, but more broadly through a long history of 
national policies. The 1973 Law of Cooperative Associations (Law No 4179) defines 
cooperatives as voluntary associations of persons, with full juridical identity, in which 
individuals organize democratically to promote economic and social improvement, and 
wherein the goal is to provide a service as opposed to generating profit. In addition to 
establishing guidelines and creating the Institute for the Promotion of Cooperatives 
(INFOCOOP), Law No 4179 also creates a series of economic incentives for 
cooperatives, primarily in the form of tax exemptions. Over time, cooperativism has 
become an integral part of the political and economic discourse in Costa Rica. For 
instance, in 1980, Law No 6437 made it obligatory for all educational institutions in the 
country to include cooperativism in their curricula.  
However, at least in its initial application among artisanal fishers, the cooperative 
model has yielded some negative results, which can be attributed to disparities between 
cooperative ideology and the social realities of fishing communities. Ovares (1989) 
examined the failures of two fishery cooperatives in the Gulf of Nicoya created during 
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the structural adjustment period, illustrating some of the problems. The first was a 
marketing and harvest cooperative that was artificially formed by recruiting fishers from 
the entire region, many of whom were not full-time fishers but were provided with a 
processing facility, vessels, and gear. The other was a production cooperative, composed 
of members of an existing cooperative, who traditionally worked in salt production and 
harvested mollusks but had little experience in fishery production. In both cases, 
members had little to no experience in the management or administration of cooperatives. 
In the latter, members did not feel a sense of ownership over the cooperative and became 
passive members or neglected the organization. Both eventually went bankrupt and 
dissolved. According to Breton (1991), because these initial attempts at cooperativism in 
SSFs were pushed by international organizations and local bureaucracies, they were not 
representative of fishers’ values or voices. They did not address the basic needs of 
fishers, nor did they bridge educational gaps (Ovares 1989). As Bené et al. (2007) have 
pointed out, the policies most frequently promoted for fishery development in developing 
nations—exemplified by these attempts in Costa Rica—have focused on production and 
rent-maximization, instead of adequately enhancing the potential for SSFs to relieve 
poverty and sustain local economies.  
Although some cooperatives exist, fishers in Costa Rica organize more commonly 
into fishing associations. Associations differ juridically from cooperatives in that 
members are not required to provide an initial financial contribution to a common fund, 
and associations serve to benefit each member of the society, rather than to fulfill a 
common economic or social goal (Law No 218, Law of Associations). Fishing 
associations are also not generally geared towards production or marketing activities. 
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Instead, they may specialize in communal development or solidarity, much like cultural 
associations (Law No 218). For the purpose of understanding community-based 
conservation and co-management in Tárcoles and Chira, the distinction between these 
organization types is tenuous. Both involve democratic decision-making through general 
assemblies, where members are elected to fulfill administrative and other duties. 
Moreover, according to a recent characterization of institutional and civil actors, fishing 
organizations in the Gulf of Nicoya tend to focus on facilitating paperwork and licenses, 
as opposed to capacity building and community development (Marín Cabrera 2012). 
However, in the cases of Tárcoles and Palito, both types of fishing organizations play 
significant roles in community development, capacity building, and the promotion of 
alternative economic activities. Nonetheless, the differences between the two cases are 
rooted in economic factors—namely, differential access to local and regional markets. In 
the following subsections, I explore some of the incentives for and benefits of sustained 
collective action in Tárcoles and Chira, as well as some of the factors that have facilitated 
the creation of AMPRs. 
 
3.2. Incentives for Collective Action in Tárcoles 
CoopeTárcoles R.L. is the only marketing and production cooperative of small-
scale fishers remaining in Costa Rica (Marín Cabrera 2012). Some cooperatives exist in 
the commercial sector (e.g., among shrimp and tuna producers), while others focus on the 
provision of fishing supplies. There are currently 40 members in CoopeTárcoles R.L., 
five of which are women. Some members fill elected positions in the cooperative’s 
specialized councils: an Administrative Council, which oversees administrative and 
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operational activities (e.g., reports, sales, expenses); a Monitoring Council that monitors 
and supervises all activities, including those of the Administrative Council, to ensure 
proper functioning; and finally, a Committee on Social Welfare, which addresses social 
and communal development activities (e.g., beautification of communal spaces; D. 
Chacón, interview, 2013). Major decisions and elections are made during an annual 
general assembly of all members, and positions are elected by majority vote. There are 
also approximately 10 employees working in the administrative office, the processing 
facility, and the storefront. Unlike other fishing cooperatives in Costa Rica, 
CoopeTárcoles R.L. has survived since its inception in 1985, overcoming bouts of 
internal conflict and financial turmoil. According to the responses of several informants, 
the cooperative faced significant administrative issues during its first fifteen years, 
including: debt and financial deficits, which one fisher attributed to excessive leniency in 
financing fishers’ expenses; a related problem of alcohol abuse and short-sighted 
handling of earnings among fishers; embezzlement by administrators, who were hired 
individuals from outside the community; and internal theft of product by employees in 
the cooperative’s storefront.  
Findings from interviews with fishers and other community members in Tárcoles 
suggest that incentives for collective action among fishers are overwhelmingly tied to 
economic factors—as much for the formation and maintenance of the cooperative as for 
requesting the recognition of the AMPR. Several respondents, including the president of 
the cooperative, cited problems with intermediaries as a major impetus for cooperativism. 
Distributors would commonly cheat locals, buying product from fishers at significantly 
lower prices than was reasonable in relation to market prices, which shifted profit away 
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from the community. Additionally, the fishers accrued debts with suppliers whenever 
fishing trips were not successful. The cooperative became an instrument for guaranteeing 
fair prices, selling fishery products collectively through a common storefront, and 
collectively financing expenses for supplies, therefore bypassing the need for 
intermediaries and external suppliers. Organizing under the cooperative framework was 
also considered beneficial by founding members because of tax incentives and ease of 
access to fishery development programs.  
Moreover, the labor and profit distribution model employed in CoopeTárcoles 
R.L. is characterized by financial equity, a characteristic cited by seven informants as a 
strength of the cooperative. Once landings from a fishing trip are turned in to the 
cooperative for appraisal and expenses are subtracted, profits are divided equally among 
three parties: the vessel owner (a cooperative member), the captain, and the peón or 
worker aboard the vessel. In cases when the vessel owner is also the captain, he or she 
receives two thirds of the profit. On the other hand, according to several fishers, workers 
aboard commercial vessels receive significantly smaller shares. One fisher recalled being 
offered 10% of profits as a worker aboard a shrimp trawler, which he qualified as 
unreasonable considering the intensity of labor and time spent at sea.  
When asked about their perceptions of the importance of conservation in the area 
of Tárcoles, all fishers recognized it as important if not essential, but their responses 
reflected an emphasis on the economic benefits of conservation for fishing activities. 
Three participants expressed a view that their support of conservation was contingent 
upon its coexistence with sustained fishing. Fishers are not in favor of protectionist 
conservation that excludes the small-scale sector from marine resources. Moreover, nine 
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fishers expressed that removing the shrimp trawlers from the area of Tárcoles is critical 
for conservation of the resource. The fact that economic interests figure prominently 
among fishers’ reasons for acting collectively and requesting the AMPR is not 
necessarily negative. Rather, it may stem from the socio-economic instability that 
disproportionately affects the sector. In these communities, collective action for the 
preservation of rural livelihoods is a matter of survival in the face of rapid coastal 
development, which is taking place to meet demand from tourism throughout the region, 
and the rapid degradation of coastal resources (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a).  
In their responses, fishers also claimed that factors such as trust, unity, similarity, 
and familiarity among members have contributed to the endurance of the cooperative 
over the years. This finding is seemingly consistent with Ostrom’s (1990) assertion that 
small, homogenous groups are more likely to overcome the dilemmas of collective action 
and organize for the management of CPRs. Community members in Tárcoles have 
similar educational levels, cultural and religious practices, and a shared history of place, 
albeit one that is relatively brief. Generally speaking, fisheries in Costa Rica remained 
largely undeveloped until the 1980s (Breton 1991). Findings from interviews indicate that 
fishing is indeed a novel economic activity in Tárcoles. All fishers interviewed had 
started fishing within the last two generations. Eight participants had learned to fish as a 
livelihood-sustaining activity from their fathers or uncles, who were the first generation 
of fishers in Tárcoles, while five had become the first fishers in their families. All began 
fishing at an early age, usually in their early to mid-teens, as workers aboard vessels or 
under the direction of elders. The village of Tárcoles itself has only existed since the 
1950s, and a majority of its inhabitants are migrants from other regions of the country 
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who traveled to the area in search of economic opportunities (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a). 
All community members interviewed reported that their families previously depended on 
agriculture and livestock, activities in which few of them continue to engage. Informants’ 
responses suggest that the high abundance of fish previously found in Tárcoles—and 
accordingly the ease of capturing valuable fish—created an incentive for people to shift 
away from traditional livelihood strategies. With time, fishing became central to the 
cultural identity and livelihood of people in Tárcoles, where approximately 90% of its 
inhabitants were once fishers (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a). Recent attempts at community 
development and political advocacy in partnership with CoopeSoliDar R.L., which 
emphasize the potential for community-based conservation, explicitly aim to rescue the 
community’s cultural identity from disappearing under the current development model.  
 
3.2.1. The role of an external organization: CoopeSoliDar R.L.  
After comprehensive consideration of all interviews and documents, it has 
become evident that the association between CoopeTárcoles R.L. and CoopeSoliDar R.L. 
has been a significant tool for expanding available forms of capital and facilitating 
sustained collective action in Tárcoles. The relationship has directly influenced 
community involvement in political self-advocacy, resource management, and 
community-based conservation through the AMPR. CoopeSoliDar R.L. have been 
involved with CoopeTárcoles R.L. through a process of continual informed consent, 
wherein cooperative members agree and decide upon the role of the external 
organization—which differs radically from the approach of environmental and 
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international NGOs, one that often imposes frameworks for development and is 
characterized by short-term projects with temporary funding (V. Solís, interview, 2013).  
By facilitating training and capacity building for community members, the 
relationship between the two cooperatives has increased the available human capital (i.e., 
skills and knowledge) of the community. Several efforts have been made to bridge 
educational gaps in the community, including workshops and the development of 
appropriate educational materials to inform community members about conservation, the 
law, and other topics. After 2000, when the cooperative became involved with 
CoopeSoliDar R.L., members began to address some administrative issues and reform the 
bylaws of the organization in order to include a vision of sustainability (D. Chacón, 
interview, 2013). Cooperative members realized that they could manage their own 
internal affairs without the need to hire external managers, and administrative positions 
within the cooperative are currently filled by local people who have been trained for 
management (D. Chacón, interview, 2013). In the same vein, the two organizations are 
actively involved in participatory research, wherein community members collect 
information about socio-economic indicators, as well as fishing effort and resource 
abundance. The research priorities are determined through consensus; the results are 
analyzed and synthesized by members of CoopeSoliDar R.L., and then employed by both 
organizations to make future decisions. Research efforts include a systematized database 
of landings.  
Moreover, through the jointly formed Consorcio PorLaMar R.L., the two 
organizations have been working to develop a model for rural community-based tourism, 
in which tourists and educational organizations can travel to Tárcoles, experience the 
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community, and learn about artisanal fishing (J. Naranjo, interview, 2013). The 
consortium has increased the available human capital, developing fishers and other 
community members’ skills for giving guided tours; it has strengthened social ties and 
increased leadership among cooperative members, who are actively involved in 
maintaining the consortium through elected councils and assemblies; and it has provided 
an avenue for increasing financial capital outside of fishing activities. In addition, the 
work of CoopeSoliDar R.L. has allowed the community to access funding from other 
organizations, obtained through work with larger organizations (e.g., Conservation 
International) and individual donors—an important source of financial capital. For 
instance, a large icemaker located in the cooperative storefront was acquired using 
donations and allows the cooperative to produce ice for members’ fishing trips, as well as 
to sell ice to independent fishers. In addition, administrative improvements and self-
management have ostensibly improved the management of the cooperative’s communal 
fund, made up of each member’s contribution to the association. 
Furthermore, because the members of CoopeSoliDar R.L. are experts from 
various fields (e.g., anthropology, biology, law) and have a variety of skills to offer the 
community, their relationship with the cooperative has also facilitated the formation of 
linkages between the community and other levels of governance. In a process that 
originated in the community, the two organizations requested that INCOPESCA 
recognize a community-based marine area in which the cooperative could regulate 
permitted gear, prior to the legislation enabling AMPRs. Costa Rica does not recognize 
collective property rights over natural resources, although it does recognize the sparse 
indigenous reserves that remain in the nation (Madrigal and Solís Rivera 2012), but their 
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urging influenced the development of AMPRs as a model for recognizing fishers’ 
rights—a process in which CoopeSoliDar R.L. and CoopeTárcoles R.L. were heavily 
involved with INCOPESCA (V. Solís, interview, 2013). As a result of community 
involvement, not only from Tárcoles but also other communities, the AMPR model is one 
that reflects the political influence of small-scale fishers as a user group.  
The role of CoopeSoliDar R.L. in helping small-scale fishers create cross-scale 
linkages and voice their considerations in a larger political arena can be described in two 
similar ways. Adger (2003) makes the distinction between bonding social capital, which 
refers to the relationships and social bonds found in communities, and networking social 
capital, which relates to relationships with external actors or groups. Findings from this 
research suggest that CoopeSoliDar R.L. have acted as a catalyst to strengthen and 
increase the existing social capital in CoopeTárcoles R.L. On one hand, improved 
leadership and cohesion from within the community has enhanced existing social bonds 
and made CoopeTárcoles R.L. a more valuable organization for the community. Then, by 
promoting horizontal linkages with other fishing communities in the region and vertical 
linkages with government agencies and larger international forums (e.g., the United 
Nations Equator Initiative), the relationship with CoopeSoliDar R.L. has increased the 
stock of networking social capital available to the cooperative of Tárcoles.  
Birner and Wittmer (2003) have described certain processes whereby groups of 
people are able to transform social capital into political capital; by political capital they 
refer to the “resources used by an actor to influence policy formation processes and 
realize outcomes that serve the actor’s perceived interests” (Birner and Wittmer 2003, 
298). In requesting the creation of an AMPR and participating in the design of the policy, 
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the fishers of Tárcoles have had a direct impact on the kind of legislation available for the 
co-management of fisheries in Costa Rica. The support of CoopeSoliDar R.L. has been 
essential in this process, especially for filling gaps in information and providing technical 
assistance—to achieve recognition of an AMPR, fishing organizations must gather 
substantial information about the community and resource and propose an appropriate 
management plan. Beyond the creation of the AMPR, the fishers of CoopeTárcoles R.L. 
have been able to negotiate other aspects of management in the regional political arena. 
As a result of the initial negotiations that determined gear restrictions for the AMPR of 
Tárcoles, a complete ban on all fishing within the area was established in 2012 for the 
duration of a year, for both shrimp trawlers and artisanal fishers. This arrangement was 
not perceived as fair by fishers in Tárcoles, who proceeded to collect information on 
resource abundance and the impacts of fishing gear during that first year (D. Chacón, 
interview, 2013). A year later, the fishers were able to demonstrate the recovery of the 
resource and succeeded in eliciting a new decree, whereby trawlers are permanently 
banned and artisanal fishers are allowed to fish in the area with some restrictions. The 
renegotiation of fishing regulation in the AMPR demonstrates how, by conducting their 
own research, the cooperative of Tárcoles was able to influence decision-making and 
shift policy outcomes towards their perceived model of equity and sustainability.    
 
3.2.2. Additional benefits of the cooperative 
There are several ways in which the cooperative produces benefits that extend 
beyond its members and propagate throughout the community. Cooperative members 
have access to commercialization and equitable prices for landings, but the majority of 
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independent fishers in Tárcoles also sell their fish to the cooperative. A family of 
subsistence fishers interviewed in Playa Azul reported that access to commercialization 
through the cooperative has been important for their survival. The family lives in a small 
brick house with rudimentary infrastructure, and since they lack freezer or storage 
capabilities, any fish they catch must be sold within 24 hours to local businesses or to the 
cooperative.  
According to several informants, the cooperative is beneficial because it generates 
jobs for community members. A number of people are involved in pre- and post-harvest 
labor, which entails baiting longline hooks and untangling fishing nets. The majority of 
pre- and post-harvest workers are women, who are known as lujadoras, and in some 
cases also their children. According to one lujadora, working for the cooperative is a 
good source of informal labor with flexible hours, which supplements her other activities. 
She also works as a clerical worker for the cooperative. It is worth noting that fishing 
activities are more commonly undertaken by men in the community, though perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the physical nature of the labor and the salience of traditional, 
essentialist gender roles. Meanwhile, the majority of informal labor in Tárcoles is carried 
out by women who cook, wash clothes, rent rooms, etc. in order to supplement family 
incomes. The same applies in the case of lujadoras, whose informal work is strenuous but 
make significantly less money than fishers. However, according to a recent synthesis of 
social data from the community (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a), women’s increasing 
involvement in various economic activities has promoted increased autonomy and agency 
in the community. Additionally, the informal nature of labor might grant them the 
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flexibility to care for their children and other family members, as pointed out by one 
community member interviewed.   
Biological monitoring undertaken by CoopeTárcoles has demonstrated an 
increase in prawn populations within the AMPR after the fishery closed for a year. 
Additionally, community members have observed an increase in the abundance and 
variety of mollusk species along the littoral zone, which are locally harvested and play a 
role in food security. These findings illustrate how management through the AMPR has 
benefited local ecological conditions. Finally, the community-based tourism initiative 
undertaken through Consorcio PorLaMar R.L. is providing an alternative source of 
income for some of the fishers, who give guided tours of fishing activities, but also for 
some of the women who collect mollusks in the vicinity and participate as tour guides. 
The tourism initiative was cited by three of the fishers as a valuable alternative, a way to 
make use of fishing vessels to supplement their incomes that does not require fishing. 
Others in town also benefit from the tourism, especially women who rent rooms as 
innkeepers and restaurant owners.  
 
3.2.3. Livelihood strategies 
One of the objectives of this study was to assess the degree of flexibility and 
diversity in the livelihood strategies of fishers in Tárcoles. Although seemingly ancillary 
to the other research questions, examining livelihoods—the assets, activities, and access 
to which directly affect how people make a living—is important for understanding the 
vulnerability and adaptability of small-scale fishers to changes in resource availability 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). According to Allison and Ellis (2001), vulnerability is 
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determined not only by external factors that increase risk—in this case, the 
overexploitation and contamination of the gulf’s marine resources, as well as rapid 
coastal development threatening fishers’ rights to coastal land (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 
2009)—but also by the ability of fishers to adapt to risks, which is often operationalized 
in terms of resilience or robustness. They demonstrate how, contrary to simplistic policies 
that frame it as static, the fishing sector is dynamic in composition and fishers respond to 
different drivers (e.g., demand, resource flow) in a variety of ways.  
The fishers of Tárcoles exhibit limited livelihood flexibility from one standpoint. 
For a majority of fishers in the Gulf of Nicoya, fishing is intricately tied up with 
community identity; they are interested in continuing to fish and are less willing to 
drastically shift to alternative economic activities than fishers in other regions of the 
country (Marín Cabrera 2012). In Tárcoles, where fishing has been a primary economic 
activity and remains important for community members, established fishers are persistent 
and reluctant to seek livelihoods outside the fishing sector. Four participants claimed that, 
when faced with resource scarcity, they continue to fish week after week regardless of 
accruing debt to suppliers or the cooperative. Formal and informal interviews indicate 
that fisherfolk value occupational independence—i.e., not being subordinate to a boss or 
manager and having flexible schedules. However, their persistence in the face of scarcity 
cannot be entirely attributed to unwillingness. There are few economic alternatives in 
Tárcoles, and even less in nearby Playa Azul, which is further from the highway that 
connects coastal towns. Aside from continuing to fish when landings are scant, it is 
possible for fishers to work as farmhands in nearby agricultural operations or in 
construction, both of which usually require them to travel outside of town. According to 
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community members’ responses in Tárcoles, these are not regarded as sources of stable 
employment but can help supplement income seasonally. One fisher interviewed in Playa 
Azul travels for additional labor during the less productive dry season (December-April). 
Another alternative is to work in some segment of the tourism sector, which is also 
mediated by distance and, more importantly, education. The majority of people in 
Tárcoles only achieve a grade school education, and few are fluent in foreign languages. 
Nonetheless, CoopeSoliDar R.L. (2010a) have noted that transportation from Tárcoles to 
other coastal cities has improved in recent years with the construction of the main 
highway, which is contributing to community development in terms of access to jobs and 
education. 
Of the informants interviewed, three ex-fishers and one cooperative member in 
Group 1 have transitioned into or oscillated between fishing and local tourism. Two of 
them work as guides or captains in a local boat tour of the Tárcoles River, showing 
tourists the high densities of American crocodiles and birds along its banks; one of them 
also owns a fishing vessel and is associated to the cooperative, but allows others to fish in 
it while he works in tourism and collects a portion of the profit. Another is the owner of 
one of three crocodile tour companies in Tárcoles. The last one is a founding member of 
the cooperative, who left during the years of financial conflict, and has since worked as a 
security guard in nearby hotels and for a crocodile tour company. One of the fishers 
interviewed emphasized the hardships of fishing, and expressed a desire for his children 
to gain an education rather than become fishers. His response illustrates how attitudes 
seem to be shifting in the community at large, which may be at the brink of a change in 
livelihood strategies. A survey carried out by CoopeTárcoles R.L. and CoopeSoliDar 
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R.L. indicated that a large proportion of youth in Tárcoles perceive obtaining an 
education and entering other labor markets as the best way to improve the future of the 
community (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2010a).  
 Although opportunities are limited for the current generation, the fishers of 
Tárcoles exhibit a high degree of intra-sector flexibility, as indicated by their 
diversification of fishing strategies. Allison and Ellis (2001) noted that livelihoods are 
complex, and can change seasonally or cyclically in response to resource availability. 
Fishers in Tárcoles use traditional knowledge of lunar cycles to predict high populations 
of shrimp, and have great knowledge of specific fishing grounds. Moreover, several 
respondents claimed that acquiring different fishing skills improved their ability to make 
a living. Fishers in Tárcoles employ a variety of gear for different target groups: gillnets 
between 5” and 7” in mesh width are used to harvest commercially valuable species (e.g., 
spotted rose snapper, Lutjanus guttatus; snook, Centropumus spp.); gillnets with finer 
mesh-sizes (3-3.5”) are used to harvest shrimp; bottom-set longlines are used for 
capturing demersal fish species (e.g., corvinas, Family: Sciaenidae; groupers, 
Epinephelinae spp.), while surface longlines specifically target mahi-mahi or dorados 
(Coryphaena hippurus), which are more common during certain times of the year; and 
finally, some fishers practice free-diving for lobsters, especially in Zone 1 (see Figure 2), 
although it is no longer permitted as per the AMPR management plan. In addition to gear 
diversity, fishers depend heavily on mobility as a means to increase their catches—this is 
a troubling point, given that some fishers now travel as far as the southern border of the 
country and even Panama to find fish. Of course, access to diverse fishing strategies is 
inflected by class. Some fishers, especially those I interviewed in Playa Azul, have no 
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access to vessels with powerful motors or different types of gear, which makes them 
especially to vulnerable to scarcity and changes in regulation. More careful study would 
be beneficial for determining the adaptability of fishers’ livelihoods in this entire region. 
 
3.3. Collective action and external organizations in the Isla Chira AMPR 
Because the majority of my fieldwork was conducted in Tárcoles, the case of the 
AMPR in Isla Chira is presented more briefly here to provide perspective on a different 
case, one in which grassroots fishing organizations have also worked with en external 
organization for the management of the marine area. Two very different communities are 
part of the Palito-Montero AMPR in Isla Chira. In Palito, the Association of Handline 
Fishers of Palito (ASOPECUPACHI) is composed of entirely of handline fishers, as their 
name suggests. They have been committed to sustainability and responsible fishing since 
1995, when they requested that fishing gear be restricted in the area currently protected as 
the AMPR—protection was granted by INCOPESCA well before the enabling legislation 
(Salas et al. 2012). The fishers of ASOPECUPACHI have since maintained a monitoring 
program to prevent the use of gillnets in the area (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013). The fishers 
of Palito have received greater attention and support as a result of their initiatives, and 
were responsible for establishing the AMPR that has now covers both communities 
(Babeu et al. 2013). On the other hand, the Association of Mixed Fishers of Montero 
(ASOMM) only recently began shifting towards more sustainable practices. Their request 
to protect their portion of the marine area was approved in 2012 as an extension of the 
Palito AMPR. Many fishers in Montero still use fine-mesh gillnets, which have low 
selectivity, to capture shrimp outside of the AMPR (Babeu et al. 2013). Members of 
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ASOPECUPACHI oppose the use of gillnets, which they perceive as harmful for the 
resource (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013), but some non-members from Palito and the majority 
in Montero still utilize them because shrimp is a more valuable product than fish captured 
using handlines (Babeu et al. 2013). Nonetheless, fishers in Montero recognize the 
necessity and benefits of the AMPR, and contribute to monitoring and enforcing the 
management plan (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013). 
The fishers in Palito do not have their own receiver or storefront, although they 
are in the process of creating one (Babeu et al. 2013). Fishers here are also isolated from 
the mainland, which decreases the potential for commercialization. The majority of them 
sell fish to the same intermediary, a local with whom they have accumulated varying and 
inconsistently recorded debt over the years (Babeu et al. 2013). On the other hand, fishers 
in Montero sell their product to fish markets for local consumption on the island (Babeu 
et al. 2013). In a recent socioeconomic study of the two fishing communities, Babeu et al. 
(2013) found that the majority of families interviewed live below the poverty line and 
approximately 50% of them relied on additional sources of income to supplement their 
livelihoods, since fishing was not sufficient. In addition, many fishers in the island are in 
debt with the social security office, which affects the availability of basic health care for 
the inhabitants (J. Cole, interview, 2013). Members of ASOPECUPACHI are actively 
involved in communal development and seek capacity-building courses or workshops to 
improve their skills, to a greater degree than non-members in Palito and fishers in 
ASOMM (Babeu et al. 2013; CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013). In Palito, the members of 
ASOPECUPACHI have also developed an aquaculture project for farming oysters, in 
which several members and non-members are now involved (Babeu et al. 2013). The 
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oyster project and the various courses taken by community members have provided a 
means to increase available human and financial capital, as well as to diversify livelihood 
strategies—these are efforts that stem from within community organizations.  
Fundación MarViva is an environmental NGO that has traditionally worked in 
marine conservation in Colombia and Panamá, and recently began working in Costa Rica. 
The organization acquires funding from several sources, including other NGOs, 
government, trusts, grants, and donations. Their objectives have centered on creating an 
ecological corridor in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, focusing on regions of biological 
importance that have received less attention than the Galápagos Islands off the coast of 
Ecuador (J. Cole, interview, 2013). In Costa Rica, the work of MarViva was initially 
protectionist. They established agreements with INCOPESCA, MINAE, and the SNG for 
jointly patrolling MPAs. As a result, they were not initially well received by communities 
in the southern estuary of Golfo Dulce, an area with the largest AMPR in the country and 
where most fishers have now transitioned into tourism-related activities (J. Cole, 
interview, 2013). Over time, MarViva have shifted their focus, recognizing the 
importance of communities and socioeconomic factors on the success of marine 
conservation strategies. They have worked extensively with communities of fishers in 
Golfo Dulce, where fishing associations had formed a federation of fishers to represent 
collective interests (i.e., Federación Nacional de Pescadores Artesanales y Afines, 
FENOPEA). According to Jorge Cole of MarViva (interview, 2013), the work has 
produced tangible results with regards to implementation of the AMPR and improving 
socioeconomic conditions through partnerships with a government aid program (i.e. 
Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, IMAS).  
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The relationship between fishers in Palito-Montero and MarViva was established 
more recently. MarViva has helped the fishers establish connections with Product C, a 
different intermediary that trades in sustainable seafood, as well as to begin a process that 
will facilitate eco-labeling of fishery products (J. Cole, interview, 2013). In combination, 
increasing the communities’ access to commercialization and obtaining the recognition of 
sustainable fishing through certification have the potential to improve fishers’ socio-
economic status. Helping to increase the value of fishery products through a specialty 
market that rewards fishers for responsible fishing has greater promise for sustainability 
than increasing the productivity of SSFs, as policies have aimed in the past. Certification 
may also shift economic incentives that affect fishing behavior. Instead of fishing for 
shrimp because of its higher value, fishers might begin to use handlines exclusively in 
response to improved prices. However, the economic benefits of these strategies have not 
been significant yet, and there is some indication that fishers are discouraged from 
participating in the associations and the protection of the AMPRs (Babeu et al. 2013; J. 
Cole, interview, 2013). In addition to helping with commercialization, MarViva has 
produced some research detailing the socioeconomic status of community members (i.e., 
Babeu et al. 2013); they are currently working in participatory research with fishers to 
determine the impact of various fishing gears; they have created opportunities for 
capacity building on the island; and are also working on creating connections between 
community members and the IMAS program (E. Ross, interview, 2013; J. Cole, 
interview, 2013). 
A few key similarities and differences between the situation in Chira and Tárcoles 
are worth noting here. In both cases, external organizations have been instrumental for 
 48
increasing the networking social capital of fishing organizations, especially in terms of 
vertical linkages to improve marketing and to increase political influence in Chira and 
Tárcoles respectively. In both cases, collective action is threatened by illegal fishing and 
gaps in enforcement, as the following section will address in greater detail. However, the 
economic benefits of the cooperative in Tárcoles are significantly clearer and 
acknowledged by community members than those of organizations in Chira. The 
difference in benefits seems largely a result of access to regional markets, an aspect that 
has been more directly addressed in Tárcoles through the marketing cooperative. As 
conditions continue to improve in Palito, given that the community is poised to create its 
own storefront, it will be useful to determine whether benefits increase for members of 
ASOPECUPACHI or whether insularity will continue to play a role in access to 
commercialization.  
Regarding the participation of external organizations, the relationship between 
MarViva and the fishers in Chira is characterized by a greater degree of independence 
than that observed between CoopeSoliDar R.L. and CoopeTárcoles R.L., which exhibits a 
greater degree interdependence and collaboration. While some participatory research is 
taking place between MarViva and fishers in Chira to determine the impacts of fishing 
gear in the area (E. Ross, interview, 2013), the research process that has taken place in 
Tárcoles has resulted in significantly greater involvement by community members. More 
specifically, while fishers in Tárcoles define the parameters of necessary research and are 
actively involved in the collection of both socioeconomic and biological data, a project 
undertaken by MarViva to collect baseline socioeconomic information was carried out by 
university students from the United States (i.e. Babeu et al. 2013). On one hand, the latter 
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approach might generate information more rapidly and require less effort than training 
community members on adequate research practices, but it is possible that the research 
produces fewer long-term benefits for the community (i.e., in terms of human and social 
capital). Nonetheless, both organizations are making important contributions to these 
communities, helping them bridge gaps in knowledge and create connections that will be 
instrumental for their improvement and development. 
 
3.4. Policy gap analysis: Ostrom’s design principles 
The first of Ostrom’s design principles pertains to boundaries in two senses: 
specifically, (1A) appropriate boundaries for the resource in question and (1B) 
boundaries for user groups allowed to exercise certain property rights over the resource 
(Table 1; Cox et al. 2010). According to Ostrom (1990), meeting these criteria enables 
users to resolve the issue of exclusivity; i.e., being able to exclude non-members from 
accessing and appropriating the resource. At least by the parameters that initially defined 
it, the AMPR of Tárcoles does not neatly fit the first design principle. The area is 
explicitly designed not to exclude users, but to modify appropriation rules based on 
ecological considerations for each of its six zones; and user groups in the area are diverse, 
including largely unlicensed subsistence fishers, more advanced small-scale fishers (i.e., 
those with highly mobile vessels and specialized gear), and shrimp trawlers. Additionally, 
because of the fugitive nature of various target species, it is difficult to define the 
resource stocks and to ensure their availability to some users. Fishers have also noted that 
INCOPESCA has taken a long time to place buoys to demarcate the AMPR, the absence 
of which makes monitoring and enforcement difficult. 
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During the first year, all fishing was prohibited from the coastline to the 15m-
depth bathymetry line, which resulted in improved shrimp stocks that subsequently 
spilled over to the area where shrimp trawlers could harvest them. Artisanal fishers could 
not harvest shrimp at greater depths using their gear, nor could they fish within the 
AMPR at all, an arrangement they did not consider fair. In 2013, the fishers of 
CoopeTárcoles R.L. have made and supported claims about the recovery of the resource 
following the exclusion of trawlers, as well as for the potential of sustainable harvest 
within the area by artisanal fishers. INCOPESCA has reformed the AMPR agreement, 
which now includes a permanent ban of trawlers in the littoral zone up to the 15m-depth 
line. This new arrangement does facilitate exclusivity for artisanal fishers, which they 
feel addresses the issue of spillover and creates an incentive for continued protection of 
the area.  
 Similarly, in Chira there is a clearly defined boundary for the AMPR, in which 
fishing gear is restricted but not access. The Palito-Montero AMPR is a much smaller 
area with fewer users and it is relatively easier to determine whether users are violating 
the established appropriation rules, especially in Palito where fishers have defended the 
area since 1995. In Palito, there are buoys to delimit the AMPR, but incentives for users 
to patrol the area have weakened in light of questionable benefits (J. Cole, interview, 
2013). As in Tárcoles, fishers in Palito have expressed that protecting the AMPR does not 
preclude overexploitation or the use of harmful fishing gear elsewhere in the gulf (Babeu 
et al. 2013), making it difficult to exclude others from the stocks improved as a result of 
the communities’ conservation efforts. In Montero, fishers have also decried the lack of 
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buoys and appropriate environmental investigation by government agencies 
(CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013).  
As several critiques of this first principle have pointed out, boundaries do not 
necessarily have to be clear-cut for appropriate management, and valuing clear 
boundaries may reflect a desire for analytical ease (Cox et al. 2010). In the cases of the 
aforementioned AMPRs, there are boundaries established by geographic coordinates, but 
the resource is not thereby confined, nor are boundaries between social groups easily 
distinguished. While acknowledging the benefits of AMPRs for small-scale fishers who 
have gained recognition, one institutional informant pointed to the need for all fishing in 
Costa Rica to be ‘responsible’ in order to prevent patchwork conservation (E. Ross, 
interview, 2013). However, as it stands now, fishers have repeatedly noted the 
inefficiencies of government agencies with respect to placing buoys, conducting 
appropriate investigation, and communicating clearly with users (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 
2013), all of which threaten the legitimacy of AMPRs. 
Regarding the second principle, Cox et al. (2010) determined two separate criteria 
for evaluation: first, (2A) congruence between rules for management and local 
conditions, which may include ecological and social considerations; and (2B) agreement 
between provision rules and appropriation rules, where provision refers to the investment 
made by a group of people for maintaining and augmenting the resource, and 
appropriation refers to harvest or extraction. In Tárcoles, gear restrictions are generally 
concordant with ecological conditions. Gillnet mesh-size and length limitations, as well 
as regulations for hook type (i.e., using less harmful circular hooks instead of J-hooks) 
and length of longlines aim to increase selectivity and prevent the harvest of juveniles, 
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which would have detrimental effects on fish stocks. However, gillnets have low 
selectivity and can result in incidental catch of sharks and cetaceans, while longlines have 
moderate selectivity but can also pose problems with shark bycatch (Ross Salazar 2014). 
Additionally, the impacts of trawling immediately outside of the bathymetry line are 
certainly not in agreement with local ecological conditions. Therefore, more detailed 
investigation is necessary to determine the impact of appropriation rules in Tárcoles.  
An additional finding emerged from interviews with institutional informants, 
which is not specific to the management of AMPRs but indicates a discrepancy between 
appropriation rules in the gulf and ecological conditions. Since 1985, a series of seasonal 
bans on all fishing activity in the gulf have been established in order to protect peaks of 
reproduction for various species. During the bans, artisanal fishers are compensated for 
their lost income. However, only licensed fishers are compensated and the livelihoods of 
countless unlicensed, subsistence fishers are not recognized. Moreover, INCOPESCA has 
recently acknowledged that the bans have not achieved any recovery objectives, in part 
due to non-compliance and lack of control (Fundación MarViva 2013). According to one 
informant, the commission in charge of planning closed seasons is composed of 
commercial fishing interests, and the bans do not coincide with actual reproductive peaks, 
which may further explain the policy’s failure. Overrepresentation of fishing interests in 
determining closed-seasons exemplifies capture of the policy process by commercial 
interests, an issue that must be addressed for ensuring sustainability.  
As far as social conditions, rules are largely fitting with traditional fishing 
methods in the sense that fishers are familiar with permitted gear, but restrictions on 
gillnet use and mesh size have not been well-received by some artisanal fishers. In Playa 
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Azul, for instance, illegal gillnets are commonly placed across the Tárcoles River, which 
seriously threatens species that migrate to the estuary for spawning. Only two families of 
subsistence fishers live in Playa Azul, one of which refused to be interviewed and is 
presumed to be responsible for these illegal nets. The family I interviewed reported that 
restrictions on mesh-size make it difficult for fishers like them to make a living, because 
they lack mobility to open ocean where the fish are larger. Reconciling regulations with 
local conditions is difficult in this case, but may require education and capacity building 
to ensure adequate livelihoods for rural fishers. In Chira, conditions are especially fitting 
of ecological and social conditions in Palito, as fishers have been employing low-impact 
handlines for a long time. Handline fishing is highly selective and fishers can easily 
prevent incidental capture of ecologically significant species or individuals below the size 
minimum (Ross Salazar 2014). Fishers in Montero practice gillnetting to a greater extent 
than fishers in Palito, but they do so outside the relatively small AMPR and have 
expressed no problems with the established appropriation rules.  
In both Tárcoles and Chira, ensuring that the costs of investing in the maintenance 
of the resource are equitably distributed among users and that benefits from improved 
management are proportional to investment presents a greater challenge. In Tárcoles, the 
renegotiation of fishing restrictions in the AMPR that resulted in the exclusion of trawlers 
has been a victory in this regard—it has addressed the inequality in benefits fishers 
perceived when all fishing was banned. The problem of freeriding persists, for instance, 
when fishers who use illegal gear or who are not invested in monitoring the AMPR 
benefit from augmented stocks. However, interviews suggest that individuals with greater 
involvement in the cooperative and fishery development activities receive greater benefits 
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than those who are uninvolved.  Additionally, the vision of CoopeTárcoles R.L. has never 
been to exclude community members, but to create a shift in practices in the entire 
community (D. Chacón, interview, 2013). Meanwhile, in Chira, the perception of benefits 
greatly influences involvement in monitoring for the AMPR and fishing associations 
(Babeu et al. 2013). Freeriding is much more prevalent, given the high incidence of 
illegal gillnets, and fishers do not yet see economic benefits that are substantial enough to 
merit sustained involvement (J. Cole, interview, 2013). 
The third design principle entails that actors who are subject to operational rules 
(i.e., rules for resource extraction) also have the ability to participate at the collective-
choice level (i.e., in changing operational rules). In both Chira and Tárcoles, users have 
worked in a participatory manner with INCOPESCA to determine gear restrictions and 
zoning. Participation of user groups in a common setting to determine operational rules is 
a key strength of the AMPR approach, as it facilitates self-determination and 
representation in an arena from which small-scale fishers are otherwise routinely 
excluded. However, because operational rules are determined through collaboration 
between different users, government agencies, and NGOs, the ability to modify 
operational rules is not as flexible as in some CBM arrangements where users have 
greater control. Additionally, in Chira information about the resource is not always 
readily available for making operational changes, nor is it as easy to shift operational 
strategies. Fishers in Tárcoles have worked to establish systematized knowledge of 
landings. They have greater flexibility in terms of mobility, are not constrained by 
restrictions outside of the AMPR, and can therefore make more strategic decisions about 
fishing effort.  
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The fourth principle relates to two specific characteristics of monitoring, both of 
which emphasize the accountability or membership of a monitor to the user group: (4A) a 
monitor for appropriation and provision levels, and (4B) a monitor of the resource’s 
condition (Cox et al. 2010). Fishing organizations that request AMPRs are ostensibly 
involved in overseeing the use of the resource through monitoring committees, which 
also include members of INCOPESCA and the SNG. Fishers can notify the SNG, the 
agency charged with patrolling all territorial waters, about illegal activities taking place. 
However, fishers have expressed that monitoring committees fail to meet and work 
successfully, and that patrolling measures are currently insufficient (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 
2013). The SNG’s functions are severely undermined by budgetary and personnel 
constraints. The agency counts with an annual budget of approximately 7,000 million 
colones (~$12M USD) and 500 employees; they only manage to secure coverage of 40% 
of coastlines, 25% of the territorial waters, and 0.05% of the EEZ, and must prioritize the 
prevention of drug trafficking (C. Castro Moralers, interview, 2013).  
In Tárcoles, several fishers reported that the SNG patrollers disproportionately 
stop artisanal fishers to ask them for licenses and inspect gear than they do larger vessels. 
Informal interview respondents in Tárcoles and Chira also claimed that SNG officers 
were confiscating illegal gear and re-selling it to fishers at unofficial auctions—this issue 
merits a rigorous investigation to facilitate accountability. However, collaboration 
between fishers and the SNG officers has arguably improved in Tárcoles, with some 
jointly attended training workshops (V. Solís, interview, 2013). In Palito especially, 
fishers have also taken monitoring into their own hands through the vigilance activities 
initiated in 1995. As mentioned previously, their monitoring system is costly (e.g., in 
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terms of time, effort, fuel) and fishers are discouraged to continue without adequate 
support. In Montero, monitoring is similarly carried out by users, but they are in need of a 
vessel for monitoring (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013).  
Finally, because all the former constitute monitoring of resource users, it is 
important to note that few parties are conducting research on ecological conditions in the 
Gulf of Nicoya. Fishers in Tárcoles have collected information on the resource, but none 
of it is publicly available. Meanwhile, INCOPESCA and the UNA are also conducting 
some baseline ecological research to aid in the creation of new AMPRs (A. Rojas, 
interview, 2013), but research tends to focus on commercially valuable species and there 
has not been a broader assessment of resources in the gulf (Mug 2013). Several other 
communities in the process of implementing AMPRs have reported major gaps in 
investigation (CoopeSoliDar R.L. 2013).  
The fifth design principle stems from Ostrom’s (1990) observation that a number 
of enduring CPR institutions have mechanisms for graduated sanctions—i.e., sanctions 
that increase in severity in proportion to violations. Graduated sanctions are available 
within fishing organizations. For instance, in CoopeTárcoles R.L., the assembly can 
suspend a member’s privileges (e.g., fuel, financing) for committing a violation to the 
cooperative norms, such as selling fish in another port (D. Chacón, interview, 2013). If 
violations recur or become more serious, the assembly has the power to permanently bar 
the member. On the other hand, sanctions for violating appropriation rules in the AMPR 
are mediated by the nature of co-management with the SNG. Formerly, only confiscation 
was available as a sanction for illegal gear, but a reform of the Law of Fishing and 
Aquaculture (Ley Nº 8436; Poder Legislativo 2005) incorporates graduated pecuniary 
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sanctions for certain illegal fishing activities. However, because inconsistent patrolling 
results in little certainty of sanctions for violations, the current system does not 
adequately deter illegal fishing. Finally, some unofficial enforcement also takes place. In 
Palito, fishers have fiercely defended the area from gillnetters by cutting or removing 
their nets (J. Cole, interview, 2013). In Tárcoles, when finding an illegal net in the river, 
one fisher expressed a reluctance to remove or cut it in order to avoid conflict with other 
fishers, which had occurred in the past. In both AMPRs, there are serious gaps in 
monitoring and enforcement that the communities cannot fill without support. 
The sixth design principle requires that users and officials have access to rapid, 
low-cost mechanisms for conflict resolution, within user groups and also between users 
and officials (Ostrom 1990). Conflict resolution is low-cost and easily accessible within 
community organizations, such as CoopeTárcoles R.L. According to one informant, 
fishers in the cooperative easily and vocally express discontent with other members’ 
actions and bring problems to light during meetings and assemblies, in spite of their 
otherwise reserved temperament. However, conflict resolution is not readily available 
between users and officials of government agencies. Three informants have expressed 
that some officials of INCOPESCA have been uncooperative and unwilling to take 
required actions. For instance, after making a request for a hearing with the Board of 
Directors of INCOPESCA five different times and being ignored, one community 
organization resorted to the National Ombudsman’s Office for achieving compliance—
this is an instance in which conflict resolution had a substantial transaction cost. 
Similarly, the NGOs MarViva and PRETOMA (Programa Restauración de Tortugas 
Marinas) have resorted to filing lawsuits against INCOPESCA for noncompliance in its 
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responsibilities (PRETOMA 2013; Solano 2014). Addressing the accountability of 
government agencies, particularly INCOPESCA, remains a significant obstacle for 
management. 
Finally, the seventh and eighth principles described by Ostrom (1990) are both 
related to cross-scale linkages between appropriators and other levels of governance. 
Principle 7 states that appropriators’ rights to establish their own rules are not 
undermined by governments, whereas Principle 8, which applies to larger systems, 
indicates that management activities (e.g., appropriation, provisioning, conflict 
resolution, enforcement) should be nested within stratified levels of governance. The 
management of an AMPR, in this case, is connected to fisheries regulation in the entire 
gulf, as well as at the constitutional level. As a policy, the AMPR model represents a shift 
in the direction of the seventh and eighth principles, by creating the space for small-scale 
fishers to propose gear restrictions and management plans that are subsequently 
supported by the state. By virtue of the co-management framework, all aspects of design, 
implementation, and regulation hypothetically involve collaboration between users and 
various government agencies, which validate and support users’ rules. In reality, there are 
some major gaps in these functions, as well as in the efficiency of government agencies.  
The majority of informants interviewed reported that INCOPESCA is not an 
adequately functioning government agency; it favors the interests of its more powerful 
constituents in the commercial sector; conflicts of interest undermine the agency’s 
regulation, especially within its Board of Directors; and its employees are largely 
uncooperative and unresponsive to fishers. As mentioned previously, NGOs have 
resorted to suing INCOPESCA and its former president for non-compliance and 
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withholding information. Additionally, despite a substantial lack of information about the 
state of marine resources in the Gulf of Nicoya, the agency continues to issue licenses to 
fishers (Mug 2013)—most recently, it also renewed the licenses of several shrimp 
trawlers, going against a constitutional ruling (Solano 2014). 
Lack of funding seriously impairs the organization’s ability to fulfill its numerous 
functions. The agency only counts with approximately 140 employees throughout Costa 
Rica (B. Marín, interview, 2013). INCOPESCA was established in 1994 as a 
decentralized entity of the Executive Branch, but gaps in funding and effective 
enforcement have plagued fisheries management in Costa Rica for decades. When 
management was carried out under a division of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MAG), only 3-4% of the ministry’s total funding was available for fisheries 
(Mack et al. 1992). Breton (1991) also pointed to the lack of funding for the development 
of SSFs and similarly suggested that funding was preferentially allocated to the growth of 
the agricultural sector. A significant change is necessary in the agency’s structure, 
available funding, and oversight, as some analysts have already suggested (e.g., Mug 
2013). It is necessary to strengthen and streamline linkages between users and 
government organizations, improve collaboration, and make funding available to 
programs such as AMPRs. The role of NGOs has been crucial for beginning that process, 
but a great deal of work remains in the coming years. 
 
3.4.1. Additional problems identified 
Fishery subsidies: Of all the informants interviewed for this work, only one 
pointed to the impact of harmful subsidies on fisheries management in Costa Rica. In the 
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year 2000, approximately 70% of fisheries subsidies in Costa Rica (~$32M USD) were 
the kinds generally classified as harmful (Sumaila and Pauly 2006). That is, they create 
incentives for increased exploitation and maintain high fishing effort even while fishing 
is not profitable (e.g., fuel subsidies, tax exemptions, fishery development). All licensed 
fishers in Costa Rica are eligible for exonerated fuel (Poder Legislativo 2005), making it 
the most common kind of subsidy. Fluctuations in fuel prices increase the vulnerability of 
SSFs and livelihoods (FAO and World Fish Center 2008), which suggests that fuel 
subsidies may be alleviating some of the uncertainty among artisanal fishers. However, in 
the absence of stronger strategies for management and social development, fuel subsidies 
simply act as an incentive to continue fishing even though stocks are overexploited.  
Climate change adaptation: Only one informant in all interviews mentioned the 
issue of climate change, one that is expected to have serious repercussions for small-scale 
fishers and coastal cities in the coming decades. Aside from the threat of sea level rise to 
fishers’ towns, coastal fisheries are especially vulnerable to decreases in productivity and 
the effects of climate variability (e.g., increased El Niño-Southern Oscillation events). 
The specific impacts of climate change on fisheries are expected to vary, but will likely 
depend on the degree of involvement and measures adopted for adaptation (Merino et al. 
2009). Therefore, adaptation to changes in the coming years needs to become a central 
conversation for coastal communities, and may have to be facilitated in the settings 
considered for this study.  
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4. Conclusions  
From the current work, as well as from the many efforts of communities and 
NGOs explored in this thesis, it is evident that there is potential for communities to 
become protagonists of marine conservation in Costa Rica. Some have been working 
towards sustainability for a long time, and others have recently embarked in the processes 
necessary for change. Both kinds of communities will require support to bridge gaps in 
knowledge and leadership, as well as to address socioeconomic problems (e.g., poverty, 
access to alternative livelihood strategies) in the coming years. The government of Costa 
Rica has fortunately recognized the importance of involving small-scale fishers in 
management processes, most clearly evidenced by the recognition of AMPRs and the 
design of two new MPA categories that permit sustainable harvest in MPAs (Solís Rivera 
et al. 2012). The efforts of fishing communities, grassroots organizations, and NGOs 
have been crucial for the development of these new strategies. Nonetheless, as the 
findings from my thesis indicate, there are several areas of management that require 
improvement, not only in the development of the AMPR model, but also generally in 
fisheries regulation.  
Prior to the development of the AMPR model and new MPA categories, Alpízar 
(2006) proposed that INCOPESCA and MINAE work as one agency in order to increase 
and optimize the use of available funding, as well as to unify fisheries and marine 
conservation goals, noting that some of their activities may not be complementary. 
Alpízar (2006) also called for greater participation from diverse stakeholders, and that 
MPAs should be more inclusive of the artisanal fishing sector. Management is shifting 
towards the latter, but the Costa Rican government must seriously consider the need for 
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managing fisheries under the same considerations adopted for other natural resources and 
biodiversity. Other analysts have also recommended changing the structure of 
INCOPESCA to remove its overly influential Board of Directors and increase 
representation of small-scale fishing interests (e.g., Mug 2013). Decreasing the influence 
of commercial interests is critical for managing these exploited fisheries in the future, as 
regulation is currently under capture from these economically powerful interests. 
Moreover, increasing the budget and training available for fisheries regulation is 
necessary for improving monitoring and enforcement in these areas.   
Regarding the adaptability of small-scale fishers in the gulf, it may be beneficial 
to encourage different fishing associations to form larger organizations, as has been the 
case with FENOPEA in the southern region, through which fishers act collectively on a 
regional scale and increase their political influence. In addition, increasing the frequency 
of meetings for monitoring committees and their ability to alter operational rules in 
AMPRs may increase the adaptability of fishing organizations to changes in resource 
flow, although it may increase transaction costs of management. With adequate capacity 
building, it might be possible to devolve the rights over operational rules even further so 
that communities can shift fishing practices. However, methods for assessing stocks must 
be implemented urgently to guide management, and there must be some mechanism for 
accountability to prevent ecological harm from unsustainable gear types.  
As Erick Ross from MarViva suggested (interview, 2013), it would also be 
beneficial to promote the integration of AMPRs and promote responsible fishing in the 
entire gulf. The various AMPRs in the Gulf of Nicoya—Palito-Montero, Isla Caballo, 
Tárcoles, and now Isla Venado, as well as others that are still emerging—currently form 
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small patches of conservation where only relatively sustainable fishing methods are in 
use, but unless the entire region undergoes a reform in terms of permitted gear and 
fishing intensity, the effects on restoring biodiversity and stocks will be limited. 
Fortunately, the ability of INCOPESCA to issue permits for shrimp trawlers has been 
suspended indefinitely. The trawlers, which in actuality comprise a small portion of 
fishers in the nation (only 73 vessels as of 2008; Alvarez and Ross 2010), have responded 
with protests and demonstrations in order to reinstitute their rights to harvest in this way. 
A new bill is being pushed to reinstitute licenses for ‘sustainable’ trawling (PRETOMA 
2014), which illustrates the persistence of these commercial interests, and must be 
opposed. Communities of artisanal fishers and NGOs are working tenaciously towards 
greater social and ecological sustainability, but a significant shift will be necessary in the 
political realm in order to effect the changes necessary to protect these fisheries for future 
generations. 
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: 
Applying the Institutional Grammar Tool to  
Understand Fishery Regulation in Costa Rica  
1. Introduction 
The importance of artisanal or small-scale fisheries (SSF) for food security, 
sustainable livelihoods, and alleviating conditions of poverty in developing nations has 
gained increasing attention in the academic literature (Allison and Ellis 2001; Defeo et al. 
2013; Kitinger et al. 2013) and in the work of international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs; e.g., Bené et al. 2007; FAO and WorldFish Center 2008). More 
than half of fisheries landings in developing nations are generated by small-scale fishers, 
90-95% of which are directly consumed by people (FAO & World Fish Center 2008). 
Small-scale fisheries also provide approximately 90% of all fisheries jobs worldwide 
(Kittinger et al. 2013). Some characteristics of SSFs in developing nations include: 
multiple target species and gear types, vulnerability to climatic variability, weak 
regulation, and thus susceptibility to overcapacity and high rates of illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing (FAO & World Fish Center 2008; Kittinger et al. 2013).  
In the Gulf of Nicoya, a rich tropical estuary on the Pacific coast of Costa Rica, 
the artisanal sector captured approximately 9,714 metric tons/year from 1994-2005, 
which comprised 65% of the nation’s total landings (Chacón et al. 2007). The artisanal 
sector in the Gulf of Nicoya is made up of several thousand fishers who directly rely on 
capture for subsistence through direct consumption or sale in local and regional 
markets—the exact number is difficult to estimate, but there are approximately 12,000 
artisanal fishers in all of Costa Rica, a large portion of which live in the gulf region 
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(Turriago 2013). Recent findings support the conclusion that SSFs continue to be critical 
for social sustainability and local economies in Costa Rica, as well as throughout Central 
America (Solís Rivera et al. 2012; Turriago 2013).  
During the 1970s, Costa Rica developed an extensive national park and protected 
area (PA) system, comprised primarily of terrestrial PAs with some adjoined marine 
portions. Currently, there are 20 marine protected areas (MPAs) in Costa Rica, which 
cover only approximately 17.5% of the territorial waters and 0.9% of the nation’s vast 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ; Alvarado et al. 2012). Communities dependent on 
fishing grounds in these areas were never consulted or included in the decision making 
processes that resulted in MPA designation and associated fishing restrictions (Solano 
2005). Protected areas are arguably necessary for managing ecologically important zones, 
but non-inclusive planning undermines communities’ traditional rights of access and 
tenure over natural resources. Some of the unintended social impacts generally associated 
with the global increase in national parks and other PAs, which include displacement and 
economic losses to livelihoods, have been thoroughly reviewed in West and Brockington 
(2006). However, the specific impacts stemming from the management of MPAs have 
received considerably less attention (Solís Rivera et al. 2012) or have been the subject of 
studies limited by sample size and heterogeneity (e.g., Mascia et al. 2010). 
In Costa Rica, some mechanisms have been developed for the inclusion and 
participation of local communities in the management of MPAs, as well as new forms of 
marine governance in Costa Rica. Most notably, a legal framework exists that recognizes 
fishing organizations or communities’ requests to establish marine conservation areas in 
which fishing is restricted to manual, small-scale methods, known as Marine Areas for 
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Responsible Fishing (AMPR; Poder Ejecutivo 2009). Gear restrictions in AMPRs are 
determined using the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) code of 
conduct for responsible fisheries (FAO 1995), which has been legally recognized as an 
important tool for management in Costa Rica (Executive Decree No. 27919, 1998). 
Fishing organizations and other stakeholders determine the extent of AMPRs through a 
participatory zoning process. Once determined and approved, the areas are implemented 
and enforced using a co-management approach in which communities collaborate with 
government agencies, namely the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
(INCOPESCA) and the national coastguard service (SNG), by forming monitoring 
committees.  
In spite of recent moves toward inclusion, however, case studies from the region 
suggest there may be conflicts of interest in the management of MPAs, which 
preferentially benefits profitable sectors (e.g., touristic recreational, industrial), and that 
there are a number of underlying social problems left to address (e.g., poverty, 
education), all of which preclude fully participatory management in MPAs and AMPRs 
(Solís Rivera et al. 2012). Additionally, communities generally do not feel included or 
represented in decision-making for the management of MPAs in Costa Rica (Solís Rivera 
et al. 2012). Findings from my fieldwork and interviews with community members of 
several communities in the Gulf of Nicoya suggest that social inequalities affect fisheries 
and environmental regulations. More specifically, several participants and community 
members have expressed that rules and enforcement practices affect the artisanal sector 
disproportionately and that large-scale interests are favored.  
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Current environmental policy and legislation in Costa Rica tend to emphasize the 
need for sustainable use of natural resources by multiple users, citing their importance for 
the development of communities dependent on them, as well as for economic growth and 
environmental protection (e.g., Poder Legislativo 2005). However, the aforementioned 
findings may reflect incongruences between the stated objectives of legislation and the 
nature of the rules being prescribed, as well as their enforcement. Grounded in the social 
construction framework of analysis, Schneider and Ingram (1993) suggest that social 
constructions of populations targeted by policy may result in the inequities that pervade 
regulatory action (e.g., in agricultural policies of the United States). By social 
construction, the authors refer to the “cultural characterizations or popular images of the 
persons or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public policy” 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993, 334). The reported complaints with respect to fishery 
policies in Costa Rica—specifically, the lack of representation and unequal prescription 
of rules to the detriment of small-scale stakeholders—may stem from constructed 
perceptions of fishers, whether rooted in reality or not. Several informants interviewed 
during July and August of 2013 suggested that fishers are perceived as lazy and wasteful, 
in spite of their work being physically and emotionally demanding. More generally, the 
high incidence of poverty among small-scale fishers throughout the world has been 
repeatedly framed as the consequence of their own inability to manage fisheries, thus 
justifying the need for top-down regulation (Béné 2003). According to Schneider and 
Ingram (1993), the social constructions of target populations can affect the distribution of 
costs and benefits that result from policy actions. Social constructs are influenced by the 
existing ideology and values about specific groups’ roles in society, which are set in 
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specific ‘geographies of discourse’—i.e., the ways in which ideas are produced, 
disseminated, and consumed, which are shaped by the specific socio-economic context 
and power relations at play in different settings (Dixon and Hapke 2003).  
The objective of the current paper is to conduct a systematic analysis of relevant 
policies currently being implemented in Costa Rica in order identify potential biases at 
the level of legislation and officially adopted practices. Because of its comprehensiveness 
and documented suitability for the study of institutions governing common-pool 
resources (CPR), the present study employs elements of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2005, 2007) to understand and describe the 
context of policies. More specifically, I apply the institutional grammar developed by 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) to analyze legal documents related to the management of 
fisheries and AMPRs in Costa Rica. The following section provides some important 
background on the analytical framework and its application. 
 
1.1. The Institutional Grammar Tool 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) originally proposed the institutional grammar as a 
general framework for the linguistic analysis of institutional statements, which they 
define as the specific prescriptions actors use to structure institutions. Institutions, in turn, 
are the set of rules that arise from repeated and structured interaction between actors 
(Ostrom, 2005, 3). Basurto et al. (2010) emphasize the distinction between institutions as 
and institutional statements—the former is a broader concept that includes stated rules 
and unwritten “rules-in-use,” whereas the latter refers to statements that are linguistic in 
nature, are explicitly stated or written, and can thus be analyzed as separate units of 
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observation. Basurto et al. (2010) and Siddiki et al. (2011) have refined the analytical 
framework into an institutional grammar tool (ITG), providing more specific instructions 
for applying it, as well as contextual factors to consider.  
The syntax of the revised ITG contains six linguistic components that may be 
identified in each institutional statement, represented by the acronym ABDICO. A 
summary of syntax elements and examples can be found in Table 3. The attribute (A) 
refers to the actor, either an individual or a group, to whom the institutional statement 
applies or who must carry out the action prescribed. The attribute may be clearly defined 
or described in the statement, but it may also be implicit (Basurto et al. 2010). The 
attribute takes a prescribed action upon the object (B), which may be animate or 
inanimate. The object was not part of the original institutional grammar, but has been 
adopted because it has been found to increase intercoder reliability (e.g., among members 
of a research team) and reduce ambiguity in coding (Siddiki et al. 2010). The deontic (D) 
is the prescriptive operator of the statement, which determines whether an action is 
allowed (Permitted), required (Obliged), or prohibited (Forbidden)—e.g., must, must not, 
may, should, etc. (Crawford and Ostrom 2005). The deontic is normally explicit, but 
Basurto et al. (2010) have suggested that it can also be implicit (e.g., if already stated in a 
previous statement). The aim (I) of an institutional statement is the action itself, that 
which is taken by the attribute. The condition (C) refers to any qualifiers of the aim, 
including when, where, or how the action is to take place. If the condition is not explicitly 
stated, then the default condition can be understood as “at all times” (Siddiki et al. 2011, 
85). Finally, the or else (O) component is the sanction or punitive action associated with 
violating the prescription of the institutional statement.   
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Table 3. Definitions and examples of IGT syntax elements.  
 
ADICO 
Component 
 
Definition 
 
Coding Examples 
 
Attribute  
 
Agents charged with performing a 
particular action* 
 
Fishers 
Fishing organization 
INCOPESCA 
 
oBject  Animate or inanimate part of the 
statement that is the receiver of an 
action* 
AMPR management plan 
Fishing license 
 
 
Deontic  Prescriptive operator that specifies 
whether an action is required, 
permitted, or prohibited* 
Must/must not  
May/may not 
aIm  Action* Communicate 
Obtain 
Practice fishing 
 
Condition  Spatial, temporal, and/or procedural 
boundaries in which an action is to 
be performed* 
To ensure sustainability 
Within 24 hours of landing 
Annually 
Or else  Punitive sanction associated with 
not performing an action as 
prescribed* 
Fine of 10 base salaries 
Prison sentence 
*Source: Siddiki et al. 2012 
 
Following the ABDICO syntax, institutional statements can be classified as 
shared strategies, norms, or rules based on their linguistic structure (Crawford & Ostrom 
1995). Shared strategies adopted by participants have a syntactic structure of AIC/ABIC 
— strategies involve an aim carried out by an actor or attribute, possibly upon an object, 
under certain conditions, but are not defined by a deontic, nor do actors face sanctions (or 
else) when strategies are not adopted. Norms, on the other hand, are characterized by the 
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syntactic structure ADIC/ABDIC, because they contain a deontic that defines whether the 
action is permitted, required, or prohibited. Finally, rules are institutional statements that 
contain all six linguistic components and have the structure ADICO/ABDICO, because 
they also contain an explicitly stated sanction (or else) that applies when the prescription 
is violated. According to Ostrom’s (2005) definition, the concept of rules represents the 
enforcement of prescriptions with respect to a specific deontic, and depends on 
participants’ shared understanding thereof. When used in common parlance and other 
social sciences, however, rules may refer more broadly to precepts, instructions, 
regulations, or principles (Ostrom 2005).  
Basurto et al. (2010) demonstrated the utility of the IGT syntax by analyzing two 
pieces of U.S. legislation, one at the national level and one at the state level, by dividing 
them into individual units of observation, the institutional statements themselves, and 
coding them according to the ADICO syntax. The IGT approach yields quantifiable 
measures of the content of legislation (e.g., the number of statements directed at a 
specific attribute; the number of rules present and the nature of sanctions) and allows the 
analyst to move forward with a nested analysis of the document—i.e., grouping 
statements by desired syntactic components to identify biases or emphases in legislation 
(Basurto et al. 2010). The IGT has also been used to compare formal and informal 
institutions, and the effect of their interaction on compliance with aquaculture laws in 
Colorado (Siddiki et al. 2010, Siddiki et al. 2012). Similarly, the aim of this paper is to 
examine the relationship between the rules-in-form, those explicitly expressed in laws, 
and the rules-in-use or working rules (Ostrom 2005), as they occur in the management of 
AMPRs and fisheries in Costa Rica.  
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2. Methods 
2.1. Selection of Primary Documents 
Because it regulates the behavior of both resource users and organizations 
involved in the implementation and enforcement of national fishery policies, I analyzed 
the comprehensive Costa Rican Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Ley Nº 8436; Poder 
Legislativo 2005). The Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture was issued by the nation’s 
legislative assembly in March of 2005 and was drafted by a group of senators through a 
process that involved extensive political negotiations and over 300 motions for consensus 
(Cajiao 2005). Several minor reforms of the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture have been 
approved and published. Two important reforms of the law are considered here to 
supplement analysis: (1) the reform to Article 9, which alters fishing prohibitions within 
MPAs and national parks (Poder Legislativo 2010), as well as a social-environmental 
report produced to examine the implementation of these changes (Corella et al. 2011); 
and (2) a reform that extends and further specifies the prohibited fishing gear and 
practices under the major fishing law (Poder Legislativo 2013). In addition, I analyzed a 
second piece of legislation, an executive decree that outlines the regulations for the 
creation and implementation of AMPRs (Poder Ejecutivo 2009).  
 
2.2. Analysis 
Textual analysis of primary documents was carried out using ATLAS.ti (7.0), a 
type of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software. I used the software to create 
a coding system for classifying and organizing institutional statements, dividing them 
into individual units of observation and their corresponding syntactic elements. Legal 
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documents were analyzed according to the procedures outlined in Basurto et al. (2010) 
and Siddiki et al. (2011). All definitions, preambles, and headings were omitted from 
coding because they do not represent institutional statements. In Costa Rican legislation, 
the first and second articles usually comprise a preamble, as they list all legal precedents 
considered and definitions respectively. In order to identify broader units of observation, 
the legal documents were divided by sections and subsections, before being divided 
further into individual institutional statements, which usually consisted of a sentence or 
part of a sentence. All of the ADICO/ABDICO syntax elements within each sentence-
based institutional statement were identified and coded. Special care was taken to ensure 
that implicit syntactic elements, whether implicit as a result of sentence structure or 
nested in previous statements, were also coded and included in the analysis. Finally, 
institutional statements were categorized by their syntactic structure: i.e., statements with 
the structure AIC/ABIC (strategies), ADIC/ABDIC (norms), and ADICO/ABDICO 
(rules). Documents were not translated, but rather reviewed in Spanish. Unlike previous 
studies using the IGT, legal documents were not coded by multiple reviewers, but the 
results of coding were reviewed three separate times, twice with the help of an additional 
colleague. The additional reviewer was familiar with linguistic analysis and Spanish-
English translation, and was trained further on the specific procedures outlined above and 
the nature of the IGT. While intercoder reliability is important for differentiating some of 
the specific components (e.g., conditions, or else statements), it does not have a 
substantial effect on the ability to identify institutional statement types (i.e., norms, 
strategies, rules) in legislation (Basurto et al. 2010).  
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Additionally, I conducted a nested analysis of the data by focusing on specific 
syntactic elements (Basurto et al. 2010). I analyzed the modal or most frequent deontic 
components according to attribute groups to which they corresponded in order to identify 
patterns that may be present. This was of interest because deontic operators have different 
prescriptive weights—e.g., the “must” deontic is associated with actions that are required, 
whereas the “may” deontic refers to something that is permitted but not required. Deontic 
operators were divided according to whether the action they prescribe is obliged, 
permitted, or forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 2005). Attributes were grouped in two 
ways: first, by institutional statements that apply to user groups (e.g., all fishers, sport 
fishers, commercial fishers, tuna seiners) and statements that apply to government actors; 
then, specific subsets of these general groups were selected to create a group of attributes 
for statements that apply to small-scale fishers (i.e. removing attribute codes that only 
apply to medium- and large-scale fishers), and a group that contains all attributes 
referring specifically to INCOPESCA (see Table 4). I used Boolean operators in the 
query analysis tool in ATLAS.ti to determine the number of instances that attribute 
groups co-occurred with modal deontic operators of interest. Because of the broad nature 
of classifications and the relatively high intercoder reliability of attribute and deontic 
components in other studies (Basurto et al. 2010; Siddiki et al. 2012), the lack of multiple 
coders is not expected to affect the reliability of findings for the nested analysis.   
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Table 4. Grouping and modal examples of attribute components for nested analysis. 
 
Group Name Examples (frequency) 
 
Users 
 
Fishers (41) 
Tuna seiners (27) 
Research/educational fishers (9) 
Sardine fishers (4) 
Small-scale fishers Fishers (41) 
Fishing organizations (11) 
Permit/license holders (16) 
Captain of a vessel (12) 
 
Government INCOPESCA and related (180) 
SNG (11) 
MINAE (10) 
The state (9) 
Agencies (5) 
INCOPESCA INCOPESCA (159) 
Executing agency (10) 
Representatives of INCOPESCA (2) 
President of INCOPESCA (1) 
 
2.3. Contextual Information 
It is important that findings obtained from IGT analysis of legislation are 
evaluated using information about the actors involved, the legal and political context, and 
the reality of implementation and enforcement on the ground (Sidikki et al. 2012). It is 
also important to consider the influence of power structures and discourse when applying 
the IAD framework to a particular problem (Clement 2009). This research is strengthened 
by careful consideration of the context of AMPR and fishery management in Costa Rica. 
Specifically, contextual understanding is founded on previous collection and review of 
government documents, gray literature, and academic literature, as well as qualitative 
analysis of semi-structured interviews with 23 key informants. Interviews were 
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conducted during July and August of 2013. Participants included 15 fishers and 
community members and two leaders of local community fisher organizations from the 
villages of Tárcoles and Playa Azul in the Puntarenas province of Costa Rica; three 
representatives of environmental and sustainable development NGOs (CoopeSoliDar 
R.L., Fundación MarViva); two representatives of government agencies (INCOPESCA, 
SNG); and one marine biology professor from the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, 
Puntarenas. Participant selection was purposive and participant-driven (Bernard 2006). In 
addition to formal interviews, informal interviews were carried out in several locations of 
the outer Gulf of Nicoya as a means to conduct a rapid rural appraisal (Chambers 1994) 
of actors’ attitudes.  
 
3. Results 
Data obtained from syntactic coding were summarized by the frequency of each 
type of institutional statement in the two legal documents (Table 5) and the total number 
of unique syntactic elements identified (Table 6). Only 18 unique deontic operators were 
identified across both documents. A summary of modal deontic operators, grouped 
according to their prescriptive directionality (i.e., permitted, obliged, or forbidden) can be 
found in Table 7. ‘Shall’ was the most common deontic operator, identified in 126 units 
of observation. In Spanish, ‘shall’ occurs as the future tense of an action verb (the aim) or 
of an auxiliary verb—i.e. the actor will perform the action. The ‘shall’ deontic implies 
that the attribute is obliged to perform the prescribed action, but without explicitly using 
the word ‘must’ (deber). Therefore, it has a different connotation and prescriptive weight.  
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Table 5. Frequency of institutional statements identified.  
(Format adapted from Basurto et al. 2010) 
 
Unit of Observation Law of Fishing and Aquaculture 
Executive Decree 
(AMPR) 
Number of strategies (ABIC) 24 0 
Number of norms (ABDIC) 357 32 
Number of rules (ABDICO) 41 0 
Total number of units of 
observation 422 32 
 
Table 6. Frequency of unique syntax components identified in coding. 
ABDICO 
Component 
Number of 
unique elements 
Attribute 91 
oBject 122 
Deontic 18 
aIm 351 
Condition 624 
Or else 41 
 
Table 7. Prescriptive types and frequencies of deontic operators. 
Obliged Permitted Forbidden 
 
Must (74) 
Must, implicit (28) 
Shall (123) 
Shall, implicit (3) 
Oblige (7) 
Require (5) 
Require, implicit (1) 
 
 
May (79) 
May, implicit (7) 
Authorize (6) 
Permitted (5) 
Allow (1) 
Not required (1) 
 
Must not (28) 
Prohibited (22) 
May not (5) 
Shall not (2) 
Will not be  
Permitted (1) 
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A total of 91 unique attribute elements were identified in both documents. The 
most frequently used attributes included: INCOPESCA, fishers, everyone/anyone, tuna 
seiners, permit/license holders, and other government agencies (e.g., MINAE, SNG; 
Table 4).  A greater number of unique aim elements were identified (351), which 
corresponds to the variety of actions prescribed in these laws. The most common aims 
were: to issue licenses/permits (14) and to establish (e.g., norms, procedures; 11). Fewer 
of the object elements showed a modal trend. However, INCOPESCA was the object of 9 
institutional statements. In all cases, the statement prescribed for other actors to 
communicate or otherwise be accountable to INCOPESCA for any changes in permitted 
activities (e.g., landing products in foreign ports, in the case of tuna seiners). Similarly, 
the majority of conditions were unique, tended to vary with each institutional statement, 
and exhibit no modal trend. Finally, because they only occur in rules, the kinds of or else 
statements identified will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Norms (ADIC/ABDIC) were the most numerous institutional statement found in 
the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (n=357, 87.1%), as well as in the Executive Decree 
(n=32, 100%). Only 24 (5.3%) of all institutional statements identified were shared 
strategies, and 41 (9.03%) were rules. All the strategies and rules occurred in the Law of 
Fishing and Aquaculture, while none were identified in the Executive Decree that 
regulates AMPRs. In previous applications of the IGT, Basurto et al. (2010) and Siddiki 
et al. (2012) found a similar distribution in the classification of institutional statements 
(i.e., the majority were norms). In the two legal documents analyzed, norms were used to 
prescribe a variety of actions by different actors. Examples of norms identified with their 
corresponding ABDICO syntax elements can be found in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Sample norms with identified ABDICO syntax components. 
Document Text of norm ABDICO syntax components 
 
Law of 
Fishing and 
Aquaculture 
 
Article 8º — Fishing and aquaculture must be 
practiced without causing irreparable damages 
to ecosystems, without obstructing navigation, 
use, and natural flow of waters. 
 
A = fishers/fish farmers 
D = must 
I = carry out their 
activities (implicit) 
C1 = without causing 
irreparable damages to 
ecosystems 
C2 = without obstructing 
navigation, use, flow of 
waters 
 
Law of 
Fishing and 
Aquaculture 
 
Article 30º — Learning or research institutions 
that develop educational plans related to fishing 
and aquaculture activities must provide an 
annual operational plan of activities to 
INCOPESCA, to articulate the actions to be 
carried out. 
 
 
A = learning/research        
institutions 
B = to INCOPESCA 
D = must 
I = provide plan of 
activities 
C1 = when developing 
educational plans related 
to fishing/aquaculture 
C2 = annually  
C3 = to articulate actions 
to be carried out 
 
 
Executive 
Decree  
Nº 35502-
MAG 
(AMPRs) 
 
Article 7º — Of the Vigilance Committees. The 
INCOPESCA will promote within fishing 
organizations, the formation, training, and 
setting up of Vigilance Committees in order to 
reach the management and development 
objectives in these areas. 
 
A = INCOPESCA 
B = vigilance 
committees 
D = will 
I = promote the 
formation, training, 
setting up 
C = in order to reach 
objectives 
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Shared strategies (AIC/ABIC) identified were declaratory in nature and served to 
establish common understanding with respect to fishing activities. For instance, in Article 
76 of the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, several species are listed specifically (e.g., 
sailfish, Istiophorus albidius, blue marlin, Makaira indica) and declared to be of public 
interest for the development of sport and touristic fishing enterprises. No such strategies 
were employed to declare species that are important for the artisanal fishing sector. A 
strategy can also be found in Article 123 of the same law, in which all but commercial 
fishers are declared exempt from import taxes on goods related to fishing activities (e.g., 
vessels, motors, spare parts, etc.). Another set of strategies outlines the conditions for the 
expiration of fishing licenses (e.g., once the allotted time on the issued license had passed 
and no motion had been made to renew it) in Article 113, Law of Fishing and 
Aquaculture. 
Rules (ADICO/ABDICO) were characterized by four kinds of or else statements 
or punitive sanctions: (1) cancellation or suspension of licenses, permits, authorizations, 
or concessions for fishing and aquaculture; (2) confiscation of fishing gear or vessels;   
(3) monetary fines to be paid, defined by a set range of base salaries according to the 
severity of the violation—one base salary is equivalent to 399,400 colones or $743.28 
USD (Poder Judicial, 2013); and (4) prison sentences ranging from 2 months to 4 years. 
Only one rule (0.02%) was linked to an attribute that represented a government agency. 
Specifically, Article 153 in the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture states that any public 
official or employee who authorizes fishing or aquaculture activities in PAs will be 
subject to corresponding disciplinary, administrative, and penal sanctions. In contrast, 28 
(68.3%) of the rules identified applied directly to resource users, including commercial 
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fishers, anyone conducting any fishing or aquaculture activities, all license or permit 
holders, and captains of vessels. Of the rules identified, seven applied specifically to 
commercial fishers (i.e., tuna and sardine seiners) and established sanctions for violations 
such as landing in foreign ports without proper notice and justification or failing to 
provide appropriate information about their landings. In contrast, none were specifically 
directed at the activities of artisanal fishers; i.e., they tended to apply to all fishers. The 
results of a more specific analysis of attribute groups with respect to modal deontic 
operators are summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Nested analysis of attribute groups by modal deontic operators. 
 
Frequency of institutional statements in each major attribute group
 
 Users Small-scale Fishers Government INCOPESCA 
M
aj
or
 d
eo
nt
ic
 
gr
ou
ps
 (n
) 
Permitted (99) 18 10 76 63 
Obliged (240) 87 35 139 109 
Forbidden (68) 41 31 4 3 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
de
on
tic
 
op
er
at
or
s (
n)
 
Shall (126) 11 7 105 82 
Must (102) 64 24 34 27 
May (86) 13 7 69 59 
May not (38) 17 14 1 1 
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The Oblige deontic group was of special interest because of observed differences 
in the usage of ‘shall’ and ‘must’ deontic operators for different attribute groups. In total, 
109 institutional statements contained an Oblige deontic directed at INCOPESCA, 
whereas 35 applied to the Small-scale Fishers group. The implicit, future tense deontic 
‘shall’ was used more frequently when prescribing the actions of government agencies 
and INCOPESCA, while the ‘must’ deontic was used more frequently for user groups 
and small-scale fishers. The percentage of statements with the deontic ‘shall’ differed 
significantly (p<0.001) between the INCOPESCA (75.2%) and the Small-scale Fishers 
(20%) attribute groups. The difference between the percentage of statements using the 
‘must’ deontic in the INCOPESCA (24.8%) and SSF (68.5%) groups was also 
statistically significant (p<0.001).  
Deontic operators in the Permitted group were associated with the Government 
group more often than they were with the Users group. Meanwhile, the Forbidden deontic 
operators were used to a substantially greater extent when referring to the Users group 
than the Government group. For both the Permitted and Forbidden deontic groups, 
differences observed were statistically significant (p<0.001). More specifically, the 
Permitted deontic ‘may’ was more commonly applied to the Government group (83.3%) 
as opposed to the Users group (8.7%); and the Forbidden deontic ‘must not’ was directed 
more often at the Users group (65.4%) than the Government group (2.6%). Proportional 
differences for the ‘may’ and ‘must not’ deontic operators were also statistically 
significant at the α=0.001 level.  
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4. Discussion 
Several interesting findings have emerged from this application of the IGT, all of 
which require an informed discussion with consideration of contextual factors, different 
levels of governance, and informal institutions. On one hand, the vast majority of 
institutional statements identified in the examined legislations were norms, which carry 
no explicitly stated sanction. The prevalence of norms, which was also characteristic of 
previous applications of the IGT, may reflect the shortcomings of this analytical method 
for capturing the implicit and comprehensive nature of sanctioning mechanisms. It is 
possible that or else elements are implicit as a result of broader frameworks for 
accountability and the nested nature of legislation (Basurto et al. 2010). In the Law of 
Fishing and Aquaculture, for instance, sanctions were not explicitly stated in each article 
but summarized in a separate clause (i.e., Section X, Chapter I). In the case of the 
Executive Decree for the regulation of AMPRs, sanctions are expressed in one inclusive 
statement (Article 14, Poder Ejecutivo 2009), which prescribes that authorities follow the 
sanctions outlined in the broader Law of Fishing and Aquaculture. In order to improve 
the current methodology, it would be beneficial to separate various clauses of the 
legislation and identify overarching sanctions that would result from the violation of each 
institutional statement, but which may not be explicitly listed in each article.  
The overwhelming majority of sanctions found in statements classified as rules 
were directed at user groups, while virtually none addressed the regulating agencies. The 
difference is considerable, given that approximately 54% of all institutional statements 
prescribed actions to be carried out by government agencies specifically (Table 9), and a 
greater number of statements with Oblige deontic operators were directed at the 
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Government attribute group. The asymmetry in explicit sanctions could suggest an 
absence of mechanisms for government accountability, at least as inscribed in the Law of 
Fishing and Aquaculture. However, the explicit purpose of legislation is to define the 
behavior of citizens and user groups, while government accountability is often nested in 
larger systems of authority. The government of Costa Rica is a democratic republic with 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial powers that are ostensibly mutually accountable. As 
a decentralized entity of the Executive Power, formerly part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, INCOPESCA is accountable to the presidential cabinet and to independent 
overseeing agencies such as the National Comptroller’s Office (Poder Legislativo 1994). 
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether viable mechanisms exist to bring INCOPESCA to 
accountability to its less powerful constituents, other than petitioning the Office of the 
Ombudsman (Solís Rivera, V., interview 2013), a process that increases transaction costs 
for already vulnerable actors seeking conflict resolution.  
With regards to AMPRs, Executive Decree Nº 35502-MAG (Poder Ejecutivo 
2005) establishes a set of norms and strategies to be followed for their creation and 
implementation. Upon analysis, the decree imposes onerous requirements of communities 
or fishing organizations seeking to protect a marine area from commercial and 
exploitative fishing—onerous because the communities that seek the AMPR designation 
tend to struggle for subsistence, living below the poverty line (e.g., communities in Chira, 
Babeu et al. 2013), and also tend to lack the education (Solís Rivera et al. 2010) that may 
be necessary to draft the initial request and management plan without support. The 
information that is required in an AMPR application includes: evidence of the biological, 
fishing, sociocultural, and environmental benefits that merit the establishment of the 
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AMPR; baseline information on the socioeconomic status of the community; appropriate 
mapping according to national standards; and participatory zoning for determining 
permitted gear types (Poder Ejecutivo 2009). The University of Costa Rica was poised to 
charge a fishing cooperative in Tárcoles approximately $7,000 to conduct investigations, 
which they could not afford; the organization decided to undertake them independently 
with the oversight of INCOPESCA and the help of an external cooperative, 
CoopeSoliDar R.L. (Chacón, D., interview 2013). Currently, the creation of AMPRs 
depends on the support of external NGOs (e.g., Fundación MarViva, CoopeSoliDar 
R.L.), and while it is available to some communities, it cannot suffice as a mechanism for 
addressing the human rights of communities whose livelihoods are threatened by 
resource scarcity, and who cannot move on to richer waters in commercial vessels.    
In my analysis of the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, two other findings suggest 
an emphasis on protecting national economic interests related to commercial fishing. 
First, the various rules that apply to commercial fishers, specifically tuna seiners and 
sardine vessels, reflect an emphasis on production and preventing of losses to the national 
industry (e.g., processing and canneries). One rule imposes a monetary fine for seiners 
that fail to install required satellite monitoring systems, but the others involve sanctions 
for landing products in foreign ports or not producing for the length of issued permits. On 
the other hand, no specific statements with punitive sanctions target small-scale fishers 
specifically. The second finding is that commercial fishers enjoy greater economic 
incentives than small-scale fishers. All receive the same fuel subsidies, according to a 
provision in the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, which are harmful for the management 
of an already poorly regulated industry. Fuel exoneration and other harmful subsidies 
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(e.g., boat construction, infrastructure development) are commonly practiced and 
supported by government funding in Costa Rica; they are detrimental because they 
promote overexploitation and encourage fishing even when stocks are declining and 
when it is not otherwise profitable (Sumaila and Pauly 2006). Additionally, Article 55 of 
the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture establishes an economic incentive (i.e., a continued 
renewal of fishing licenses without fees) for tuna seiners who turn in the entirety of their 
landings to national processing plants and canneries.  
The result, as Pacheco (2005) points out, is that foreign tuna seiners are 
encouraged to keep exploiting Costa Rican waters to the detriment of national tuna 
fishers. This kind of incentive for increased production is not surprising considering the 
post-harvest sector generates 77% of fisheries jobs in Costa Rica (Turriago 2013). It is 
also consistent with trends of increased processing- and export-driven production 
associated with the neoliberalization of global and regional markets (Béné et al. 2007). In 
the region of Central America, exports account for approximately 85% of the commercial 
balance (Turriago 2013). However, while the nation’s exportation of fisheries products 
has increased rapidly in recent years, the amount being imported to supplement domestic 
consumption is greater, which may stem from increasing scarcity in the face of demand 
(Calderón et al. 2013; Turriago 2013). There are also differences in the punitive sanctions 
for national and foreign vessels that unload landings of shark fins not properly attached to 
the trunk (Article 139). Specifically, national fishers are punished with fines and prison 
sentences while foreign vessels are only fined. The difference stems from the agreements 
made in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in which 
nations cannot impose imprisonment sanctions beyond the 12 miles of territorial waters 
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(Cajiao 2005). Nonetheless, the difference in deterrent sanctions is an obstacle for 
preventing finning and illegal fishing at the hands of foreign ships. 
Finally, the finding that ‘shall’ and ‘must’ deontic operators were deployed 
differently for the Users and Government groups suggests an asymmetry in the political 
and legal discourse. In previous work with the IGT (i.e., Basurto et al. 2010) the deontic 
operators ‘shall’ and ‘must’ have been used interchangeably, as they signify the same 
type of prescription (i.e., Oblige). However, because of their differing connotations and 
the absence of sanctions for government agencies’ non-compliance, the two types of 
deontic convey different meanings for the subjects who are bound by legislation. 
According to applications of game theory, the interpretation of deontics depends on a 
rational appraisal of trade-offs—i.e., the costs and benefits of complying with versus 
defecting from a prescription (Crawford and Ostrom 2005). The costs of violating a given 
prescription are therefore related to the certainty of sanctions, and possibly also whether 
the deontic is explicit and forceful as opposed to implicit and passive. 
In the context of critical theory, discourse refers to the various factors, linguistic 
and non-linguistic (e.g., social practices, values), that shape and are shaped by power 
dynamics and social institutions (Schiffrin et al. 2001). Legal and political forms of 
discourse are influential partly because they are formulated by powerful social groups 
(i.e., politicians, in this case), and because they are employed as a means to shape 
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Van Dijk 2001). The direct objective of policy is to 
affect the behavior of target groups using prescriptive language. The Costa Rican Law of 
Fishing and Aquaculture, as mentioned previously, was drafted by senators in the 
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica, a group that differs markedly from some of the user 
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groups it legislates in terms of class, education, gender, etc. Legislators have power over 
the subjects affected by the discourse and policies they produce: the consequences to 
fishers for not accepting legal discourse and adopting its prescriptions are explicitly 
stated in the text (e.g., fines, imprisonment); however, the same consequences are not 
explicitly stated for government actors. The nature of prescriptive language in policy can 
also be influenced by social constructions of target groups, as Schneider and Ingram 
(1993) initially pointed out. In addition, Dixon and Hapke (2003) described how 
utilitarian and geographically specific values about farmers, productivity, and the 
economy have shaped agrarian policy in the United States. Béné (2003) explored some of 
the social constructions that have influenced perceptions of fishers, specifically regarding 
their poverty, which stem in part from generalizations of seminal work on the failures of 
open-access resources (i.e., Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968).  
In one of the interviews conducted for this project, an employee of INCOPESCA 
cited fishing pressure from the small-scale sector as a primary reason for overexploitation 
of marine resources in Costa Rica, but failed to mention the impacts of any commercial 
fishing activity. The informant also cited illegal fishing as a major problem in the 
implementation of AMPRs, while all other informants emphasized the lack of 
government involvement as a greater obstacle. The difference in attitudes between a 
member of the enforcement agency and those expressed by small-scale users and 
conservation stakeholders indicates a discrepancy in shared meaning about problems in 
management, as well as common objectives. It is possible that government stakeholders’ 
attitudes shape the kinds of regulations implemented by INCOPESCA, but determining 
that relationship is beyond the scope of the present work. It would be necessary to 
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conduct a more extensive survey of attitudes among a wider range of government 
stakeholders, including legislators and members of other agencies involved. Additionally, 
the aforementioned differences in attitudes pertain more to the regulatory actions of 
INCOPESCA as an independent agency and to possible differences in enforcement, 
rather than to the effects of social constructions on legislation. Determining the influence 
of broader cultural discourse on legislation is difficult, but the inequalities that have 
resulted from fisheries regulations and their enforcement in Costa Rica merit further 
investigation and resolution. 
Although INCOPESCA is the agency charged with carrying out the majority of 
prescriptions in the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, it has failed to comply with its 
numerous responsibilities. It is important to acknowledge that INCOPESCA is severely 
limited by budget and personnel constraints (Alpízar 2006; B. Marín, interview, 2013). 
There are approximately 140 employees working for INCOPESCA in all of Costa Rica 
(Marín, B., INCOPESCA, interview 2013), a number that is clearly inadequate for an 
agency charged with regulating fisheries within 613,683 km2 of jurisdictional waters 
(FAO 2004). However, five institutional and community informants interviewed—all of 
whom interact extensively with INCOPESCA for the purposes of conservation planning, 
AMPR implementation, and permitting—have suggested that financial constraints are not 
to blame for all of the agency’s problems. Specifically, informants reported that while 
some of the agency’s personnel are largely supportive and helpful, there is a general 
unwillingness to cooperate with stakeholders, especially the artisanal fleet.  
In addition, several informants interviewed reported that INCOPESCA have 
introduced sudden and unannounced changes to the requirements or costs of renewing 
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fishing licenses, rendering many fishers’ activities illegal—such a practice would 
represent a discrepancy between stated national values of social sustainability and the 
agency’s practices, but INCOPESCA has jurisdiction over such regulations at the 
operational level. It is also possible that fishers’ perceptions of shifts in regulation are 
influenced by gaps in information and communication; it would be important to establish 
a clearer measure of changes in informal institutions in order to make any conclusive 
remarks about differential enforcement. Nonetheless, the agency has failed to bring a 
number of semi-industrial fishing vessel owners to accountability for trawling in MPAs, 
which is illegal under the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture. In response to negligence 
with respect to these cases, as well as their failure to disclose requested information of 
public nature, the environmental NGO PRETOMA filed a lawsuit in the nation’s 
Constitutional Court against Luís Dobles Ramírez, the former Executive President of 
INCOPESCA, in February of 2012 (PRETOMA 2013).  
INCOPESCA has also been accused of corruption and conflicts of interest—
namely, that its Board of Directors is catering to the interests of the shrimp trawler 
industry, in which they have personal investments (PRETOMA 2014). Fundación 
MarViva, another marine conservation NGO, recently filed an appeal for the protection 
of constitutional rights (recurso de amparo) to the same court (Sala IV) against 
INCOPESCA, for renewing the licenses of several shrimp trawling vessels (Solano 
2014). In doing so, INCOPESCA has gone against the court’s recent resolution that 
declared trawling unconstitutional because it goes against the nation’s values of 
sustainability, and discouraged the issue or renewal of any more licenses. The court’s 
ruling is now been challenged by a bill that would permit ‘sustainable’ trawling, which 
 91
has already received approval in the Puntarenas regional Legislative Assembly. The bill 
is the most recent pull in what seems like a tug of war, with commercial interests and 
INCOPESCA on one side and environmental NGOs and small-scale fishers on the other, 
and it is already being contested for its failure to fully address the social and ecological 
impacts of the trawling industry (PRETOMA 2014).  
Similarly, the SNG is the sole agency with police competencies, charged with 
monitoring all jurisdictional waters for drug trafficking vessels, illegal fishing, and a 
number of other duties (C. Morales, interview 2013). The agency is also limited in 
financial and human resources: it counts with an annual budget of approximately 7,000 
million colones (~$12M USD) and 500 employees; it only manages to secure coverage of 
40% of coastlines, 25% of the territorial waters, and 0.05% of the EEZ, and must 
prioritize the prevention of drug trafficking (C. Castro Moralers, interview, 2013). 
According to several fishers interviewed, SNG officials stop and inspect the activities of 
small-scale fishers more frequently than those of commercial fishers such as shrimp 
trawlers. It is possible that ease of access and convenience influence the enforcement 
practices of SNG officials. Moreover, the SNG has the power to confiscate all gear from 
unlicensed fishers and unauthorized gear from licensed fishers. During informal 
interviews, several respondents claimed that SNG officials were targeting small-scale 
fishers, confiscating their nets, and subsequently selling them to fishers during unofficial 
auctions. Two other respondents claimed that some SNG officials are corrupt and are 
involved in drug trafficking operations. Several coastguard officers have indeed been 
arrested and investigated for links to drug trafficking (e.g., see Cerdas 2013), including 
the former chief of the SNG (Aguerdas 2013). However, fishers’ claims are not readily 
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supported simply through analysis of the legal framework, which only comprises formal 
institutions. It would be necessary to obtain more context-specific empirical evidence in 
order to examine the relationship between formal institutions (i.e., legislation) and more 
informally adopted enforcement practices on the ground.  
  
5. Conclusions 
The current application of the IGT for analyzing fishing legislation in Costa Rica 
has been useful for illustrating some important regulatory problems, which are supported 
by a contextual understanding of management in the Gulf of Nicoya. Nonetheless, there 
are several limitations to this study, which are worth noting in the discussion of its 
applicability for future research. As mentioned previously, the majority of institutional 
statements were classified as norms, which may result from the linguistic segmentation of 
institutional statements—a more inclusive methodology must be developed in order to 
account for implicit sanctioning mechanisms. In addition, the initial hypothesis that 
legislation would reflect reported biases against small-scale fishers was not supported 
solely by linguistic analysis of the legal text. Because enforcement practices are rooted in 
informal institutions, a more comprehensive survey of informally adopted prescriptions 
must be carried out in order to determine their relationship to those examined here. 
Similarly, although a nested analysis of modal deontic operators and attribute groups 
revealed a significant asymmetry, a survey of attitudes among legislators and other 
government stakeholders would be necessary to empirically demonstrate a relationship 
between social constructions of users and the production of legal discourse. Lastly, the 
analysis should be extended to several other pieces of legislation important for the 
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regulation of marine fisheries and MPAs, such as the 1998 Law On Biodiversity and the 
Law for the Creation of INCOPESCA (Poder Legislativo 1994).  
Punitive sanctions identified in the examined legislation applied almost 
exclusively to user groups, which is consistent with the role of policy in regulating the 
behavior of users. However, mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of government 
agencies were not identified in any of the legislation examined, including the Law For the 
Creation of INCOPESCA. Moreover, the Executive Decree for the creation and 
implementation of AMPRs was distinct in the sense that it conferred considerably more 
responsibilities to small-scale fishers. As a policy instrument, it effectively facilitates the 
devolution of rights and responsibilities over management in AMPRs to fishing 
commnities, but it fails to address the obstacles faced by these less powerful actors in 
gaining recognition and fulfilling the requirements for protection (e.g., collection of 
technical and scientific information). In addition, the many shortcomings of regulatory 
agencies are distinct obstacles for successful participatory management in Costa Rica. 
Recently, an association of public research universities (Presidencia de la 
República de Costa Rica 2012; Mug 2013) and a special presidential commission on 
marine governance (Anon. 2012) have issued reports in which they recommended major 
changes to INCOPESCA and its constituting legislation. The reports echo the demands of 
environmental NGOs such as PRETOMA and MarViva, as well as the conclusions 
reached in Chapter II of my thesis. In particular, they suggest removing or changing the 
structure of the Board of Directors in order to reduce the weight of fishing stakeholders’ 
input on decision-making. In this regard, it should be noted that while action must be 
taken to ensure that commercial fishing interests do not define the nature of fisheries 
 94
management, part of the solution must also be to continue to incorporate the voices of 
small-scale fishers in decision-making. The livelihoods of the thousands of small-scale 
fishers in Costa Rica have already been compromised by imprudent planning of MPAs 
and commercial overfishing, and their contributions have clear potential for the 
conservation of marine resources, as evidenced by the initiatives of several communities 
to establish AMPRs.  
Fortunately, a recent reform of the Law of Fishing and Aquaculture makes it legal 
for artisanal fishers to fish using low-impact gear in some of the internal waters in MPAs 
under the management of MINAE (Poder Legislativo 2010), and fishing communities on 
the Nicoya Peninsula are working with PRETOMA to establish the first Marine 
Management Area, a newly recognized MPA model that permits sustainable, small-scale 
fishing (PRETOMA 2013). The Marine Management Area will provide a haven for the 
critically endangered hawksbill sea turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata), as well as species of 
commercial significance currently being overexploited (PRETOMA 2013). The work 
ahead lies in strengthening existing institutions, continually evaluating and improving 
management efforts, and promoting cooperation among communities, the state and these 
important private organizations.  
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V. APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1.  List of key informants interviewed in Group 2 with their corresponding 
affiliations and date of interview. 
 
 David Chacón, president and founding member, CoopeTárcoles R.L. (Jul. 9, 2013) 
 Jeanette Naranjo, manager, Consorcio Por La Mar, R. L. (Jul. 9, 2013) 
 Vivienne Solís-Rivera, managing director and founding member, CoopeSolidar, 
R.L. (Aug. 3, 2013) 
 Berní Marín, Marine Biologist, Department of Research and Development, 
INCOPESCA (Jul. 23, 2013) 
 Jorge Cole, Communities Coordinator, Department of Sciences and Communities, 
MarViva (Jul. 26, 2013) 
 Erick Ross, Sciences Director, Department of Sciences and Communities, 
Fundación MarViva (Aug. 5, 2013) 
 Carmen Castro Morales, Director, Environmental Department, Servicio Nacional 
de Guardacostas de Costa Rica (Aug. 5, 2013) 
 Andrea García Rojas, Ph. D., Marine Biology, Universidad Nacional de Costa 
Rica, Marine Biology Station (Aug. 7, 2013)  
 
